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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-4-103(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUES 
1. Hanson Equipment's negligent repair of a rental truck caused the 
truck to break down on a trip from Utah to Washington and also caused 
unforeseen torque to build up in the truck's drive line. Dennis Normandeau, a 
tow-truck driver called to the scene, was killed when the built-up torque was 
violently released as he was preparing the truck for towing. Did Hanson owe 
Mr. Normandeau a duty of care? 
Standard of Review: Plaintiffs agree with Hanson's statement of the 
standard of review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate 
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, the plaintiffs) and 
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.1 
Preservation: Hanson preserved this issue in its motion for summary 
judgment and supporting memorandum. (See Record ("R.") at 612-631.)2 
1
 E.g., Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, f 1, 985 P.2d 892. 
2
 See also Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, % 24, 215 P.3d 
152 ("We . . . hold that by moving for summary judgment on the issue of duty, 
1 
2. Hanson never raised the professional rescuer doctrine as an 
affirmative defense, and, in moving for summary judgment, it never mentioned 
the doctrine. Hanson also failed to raise the doctrine in its briefs in this court and 
in the Utah Supreme Court. Has Hanson waived its argument that a form of the 
professional rescuer doctrine should apply? 
Standard of Review: This court does not review issues or arguments not 
preserved below, and, by failing to brief the professional rescuer doctrine on 
appeal, both in this court and in the Utah Supreme Court, Hanson did not 
preserve the issue.3 
Preservation: The professional rescuer doctrine was not preserved for 
appeal. 
Hanson properly preserved that issue for appeal."). A copy of the supreme 
court's opinion is included in the addendum. 
3
 E.g., United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1240,1240-41 (11th Cir. 2005) (the 
appellant's failure to raise an issue in his initial brief precludes him from doing so 
on remand); Princeton Biochems., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 215 F.3d 1349 
(table), No. 98-1525,1999 WL 641233, slip op. at *2 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (copy 
included in addendum) (a party may not raise on remand an issue not previously 
appealed) (citing Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379,1382-83 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)); United States v. Glover, 149 F. Supp. 2d 371, 378 (N.D. IU. 2001) 
(ordinarily, failing to raise a ground on appeal precludes raising it on remand) 
(citations omitted). 
2 
3. The professional rescuer doctrine as adopted in Utah is limited to 
professional rescuers who are public employees. Mr. Normandeau was not a 
public employee; Hanson was not the party needing rescuing; and Hanson's 
negligence not only created the need for a tow truck but also created the very 
hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. Did the trial court err in holding that the 
professional rescuer doctrine does not apply under the facts of this case? 
Standard of Review: If the issue had been preserved for appeal, it would 
have been by Hanson's unauthorized Supplemental Briefing in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (R. 1847-66.) A trial court's denial of a 
motion for new trial is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.4 "However, 
if the trial court has made a determination of law that provides a premise for its 
denial of a new trial, such a legal decision is reviewed under a correctness 
standard."5 
Preservation: This issue was not preserved for appeal.6 
E.g., Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,428 (Utah 1998). 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
See issue no. 2, supra, & pt. II, infra. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) is determinative of the second 
issue on appeal. It is set out in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Prior Dispositions, 
This is a wrongful death action. Hanson Equipment negligently repaired a 
Ryder truck, which caused it to break down on Soldier Summit in Utah County. 
The negligent repair also caused torque to build up in the drive line. The 
plaintiffs' husband and father, Dennis Normandeau, was killed when that torque 
was released as he was disconnecting the drive line so that he could tow the 
truck. 
The plaintiffs sued Hanson and other companies associated with the 
design, manufacture, and lease of the truck. (R. at 1-13.) All the defendants 
except Hanson were dismissed before trial. (R. at 413-14, 550, 577-78, 586-87, 601-
02,1398-99.) Hanson moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it owed 
Mr. Normandeau no duty, that its negligence was not the proximate cause of Mr. 
Normandeau's death, and that his contributory negligence was the sole 
proximate cause. (R. at 612-13.) The trial court denied that motion (R. at 1182-
84), and the case went to trial (see R. at 1689). 
4 
The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and 100 
percent against Hanson. (R. at 1682-84.) 
The trial court denied Hanson's motion for a new trial or, in the 
alternative, for a remittitur. (R. at 2007-26.) Hanson then appealed (R. at 2028-
29), and the appeal was poured over to this court (R. 2066-70). 
This court issued an opinion affirming the jury verdict.7 A majority of the 
panel did not reach the issue of whether the trial court correctly denied Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the issue was "not 
appealable under prior Utah case law and the facts of this case."8 One judge 
dissented in part. He concluded that the court had jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of Hanson's motion for summary judgment9 but would have ruled that the 
trial court correctly denied that motion, since "Hanson's moving papers failed to 
establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty of care to 
Normandeau."10 
7
 Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382,174 P.3d 1 (a 
copy of which is included in the addendum), rev'd, 2009 UT 44, 215 P.3d 152. 
8
 2007 UT App 382,^14. 
9
 Id. W 34-36 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
10
 Id. \ 37. 
5 
Hanson petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which 
the court granted to consider whether this court erred in its construction and 
application of the rules governing appellate review of denials of summary 
judgment.11 
After further briefing in the Utah Supreme Court, that court issued its 
decision, holding that, to the extent Hanson argued in its motion for summary 
judgment that it owed no duty of care to Mr. Normandeau, the motion raised a 
purely legal issue that was properly preserved for appeal.12 The court remanded 
the case to this court to decide "whether the district court properly ruled that 
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care."13 
B. Statement of Facts 
This statement of facts is based primarily on the facts set out in the 
plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment (R. 821-986), which were the facts that were before the trial court when 
See Order, Mar. 7, 2008; 187 P.3d 232 (Utah 2008). 
See 2009 UT 44, M 17 & 24. 
Id. 125. 
6 
it denied Hanson's motion. Both the trial court and appellate courts are 
required to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, the 
plaintiffs).15 
Dennis Normandeau was killed when he responded to a call for roadside 
assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down on Soldier Summit in Spanish 
Fork Canyon. Kristen Marion had rented the truck to move her family from 
Colorado to Washington. Hanson Equipment, Inc., a certified technician for 
International trucks like the Ryder truck, had repaired the truck just before Ms. 
Marion picked it up. The truck had been losing hydraulic fluid. The hydraulic 
fluid not only provided the truck with power steering but also kept the parking 
(or emergency) brake on the drive line released. The truck had a spring-applied 
Similarly, Hanson takes its statement of facts primarily from its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. (Compare 
Appellant's Br. at 2-4 with R. 619-25.) The plaintiffs disputed some of the facts in 
Hanson's statement of facts. (Compare R. 620-21, ff 5-7, with R. 831-33.) The 
factual disputes are irrelevant to the issues on appeal, however, because they 
went to Mr. Normandeau's alleged comparative fault in failing to check for and 
relieve torque from the drive line before trying to tow the truck, an issue that the 
jury decided against Hanson at trial. (See R. 1683, % 5.) 
15
 E.g., Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 
P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982). 
7 
hydraulically released parking brake system. The parking brake was on the 
drive line behind the transmission and ran off the power steering unit. Hanson 
replaced part of the hose that carried the hydraulic fluid to the drive-line parking 
brake. Unfortunately, Hanson did not replace the hose with an approved 
replacement part or an equivalent hose. Instead, it replaced the hose with a fuel 
hose that could not withstand as much pressure. It also spliced the new hose to 
part of the old hose by clamping it to a threaded pipe nipple, which cut through 
the new, inferior hose, causing it to leak. (See R. 840, % 1; 842-45, f f 7-15,18-23; 
R. 2078, at 48:23-49:2.) 
Hanson's negligent repair caused the newly spliced fuel hose to leak 
within hours after the truck was on the road. The loss of hydraulic fluid caused 
the parking brake to clamp down on the drive line and remain clamped, which 
quickly stopped the drive line from turning. The combination of the clamped 
drive-line brake and the weight and forward inertia of the truck as it came to rest 
caused extreme torque to build up in the drive line. (See R. 841-42, f f 3-7; 845, 
1122-24.) 
The loss of hydraulic fluid from the repaired line also caused the loss of all 
the hydraulically-assisted power steering for the driver. 
8 
As Ms. Marion drove the truck up Soldier Summit, she could feel the truck 
slow down and the power steering go out. She had to pull off the road, stop, and 
call for roadside assistance. (R. 844, % 17.) The vehicle could not be driven 
farther and had to be towed. Dennis Normandeau was eventually sent to tow 
the truck. (R. 622-23, %% 13-17.) 
Before he could tow the truck, Mr. Normandeau had to disconnect the 
drive line from the transmission. Because of the leak in the hose that Hanson had 
spliced on, a huge amount of torque had built up in the drive line as the truck 
came to a stop. As Mr. Normandeau was disconnecting the drive line, this built-
up energy was released violently, causing a part of the yoke on the differential at 
the rear of the drive line to break off. Either the yoke or the drive line hit Mr. 
Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly. (R. 845-46, Tl 24-28; 848,f34.) 
Mr. Normandeau's heirs sued Hanson, among others, claiming that its 
negligence was a cause of Mr. Normandeau's death. (R. 1-13.) Hanson moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds that it owed Mr. Normandeau no duty 
because he was "an unforeseeable plaintiff," that its negligent repair could not 
be a proximate cause of his death, and that his own negligence was a superseding 
cause of his death. (R. 612-13.) The plaintiffs opposed the motion on the grounds 
9 
that, among other things, Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. (R. 
852.) 
The plaintiffs pointed out that one who negligently repairs a chattel can be 
liable to those who it should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its 
probable use. (See R. 854-57.) The parties agreed that the foreseeability of harm 
is a major factor in determining whether one person owes another a duty of care 
(see R. 628-29, 857), and Hanson did not dispute that the foreseeability of harm to 
Mr. Normandeau was "'a triable issue of fact.'" (R. 858 (footnote omitted).) 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Hanson agreed that 
the question of duty in this case hinged on the foreseeability of harm to Mr. 
Normandeau. (R. 2078 at 29:5-7 ("What we're saying is . . . it was just not 
foreseeable that this particular accident would have arisen . . . " ) ; 33:25-34:2 
("There really aren't any other factors to consider in this case as to whether a 
duty was owed, except for the foreseeability.").16 Hanson also agreed that it was 
foreseeable that if it did a negligent repair, the hose could fail, the vehicle would 
"end up going into self-preservation and pulling over to the side of the road," the 
16
 Hanson also acknowledged that foreseeability applied not only to 
the issue of duty but also to causation. (R. 2078 at 40:25-41:2.) As applied to 
causation, the jury found against Hanson on the issue of foreseeability. (See R. 
1682, f 2.) 
10 
occupants of the vehicle could be injured, other people on the road could be 
injured, and the vehicle would have to be towed. (R. 2078 at 34:3-18; 35:1-14; 
41:14-42:1,16-19.) Hanson also agreed that it was foreseeable that, to tow the 
vehicle, the drive line would have to be disconnected, and it did not dispute that 
there could be built-up torque in the drive line. (R. 2078 at 35:15-19; 36:4-37:10.) 
The only thing that Hanson claimed was unforeseeable was that a tow truck 
driver like Mr. Normandeau would not prepare the truck properly for towing. 
(R. 2078 at 34:18-25; 37:11-14; 42:19-22; 51:21-24.) 
The trial court understood the facts of the case as follows: 
[I]t seems to me t h a t . . . when that hose fails, we end up with a lock 
on the drive shaft; and that can potentially be a very dangerous 
situation, and it's caused—that is caused by the failure of the hose. 
The guy [Mr. Normandeau] goes in. He . . . may be negligent, 
maybe he isn't, I don't [know], but anyway, he's killed by that 
dangerous condition that exists because of the failure of the hose. 
(R. 2078 at 38:18-25.) In denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment, the 
court said: 
I just feel that based on my understanding of the mechanics here— 
and . . . I'm not saying that I'm infallible on that, but based on my 
understanding of mechanics, it just seems to me that the failure of 
the hose exposes the tow truck driver who's got to disconnect, if he's 
going to tow, the drive shaft, to a hazardous situation. That 
hazardous situation, it seems, is . . . directly caused by the failure of 
the hydraulics. So I'm going to deny . . . the motion for summary 
judgment on that. 
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(R. 2078 at 53:25-54:9.) 
The case went to trial, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding 
that Hanson's negligence was the sole proximate cause of Mr. Normandeau's 
death. (R. 1682-83.) 
Hanson filed a post-judgment motion for a new trial (R. 1692-94), which 
the plaintiffs opposed (R. 1805-43). Hanson then filed, without leave of court, a 
"Supplemental Briefing in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial" (R. 
1847-66), raising, for the first time, the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claim was 
barred by the so-called professional-rescuer doctrine.17 The trial court denied 
Hanson's motion for a new trial. (See R. 1949; 2007-26.) 
Hanson appealed. (R. 2028-29.) In its docketing statement in this court, 
Hanson stated as one of the issues for appeal, "Does the professional rescuer 
doctrine . . . bar plaintiff's claims against Hanson?"18 But Hanson never 
mentioned the doctrine again, through three rounds of briefing (its briefs in this 
court, its petition for a writ of certiorari, and its briefs in the Utah Supreme 
17
 Hanson later sought leave of court to file its supplemental brief. (R. 
1941-42.) The trial court did not expressly grant that motion, but it considered 
Hanson's supplemental briefing and the plaintiffs' responsive memorandum in 
denying Hanson's motion for a new trial. (See R. 2009, % 8.) 
18
 Docketing Statement, dated Aug. 25, 2006, at 3, f (c)(7)(iii). 
12 
Court), until its most recent brief, filed on remand to this court on October 26, 
2009. 
Instead, Hanson raised many other arguments on appeal. The only one 
that is still at issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Hanson's motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of duty. All of Hanson's other arguments 
have been decided against Hanson.19 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court did not err in denying Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of duty. As Judge Orme concluded the first time around, 
"Hanson's moving papers failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson 
owed no duty of care to Normandeau "20 Hanson's negligent repair not only 
caused the Ryder truck to break down, so it had to be towed, but also caused an 
excessive amount of torque to build up in the drive line. It was undisputed that, 
before he could tow the truck, Mr. Normandeau had to disconnect the drive line. 
When he did, the excessive torque that had built up in the drive line as a direct 
See Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382, <0 7-10,15-32. 
See id. f 37 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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and proximate result of Hanson's negligent repair was released violently, killing 
Mr. Normandeau. 
The law is well established that one who negligently repairs a chattel can 
be liable to those who it should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its 
probable use. Mr. Normandeau was a foreseeable plaintiff, to whom Hanson 
owed a duty of care. There is no public policy reason to shift the loss caused by 
Mr. Normandeau's death from Hanson, the culpable party, to Mr. Normandeau's 
widow and children. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the trial court did 
not err in denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment. (Pt. I.) 
Hanson suggests that the professional rescuer doctrine should bar the 
plaintiffs' claim. The court should not reach Hanson's professional rescuer 
argument because the argument was not before the trial court when it denied 
Hanson's motion for summary judgment, was not properly preserved for appeal 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HANSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUTY. 
A. Hanson Owed Mr. Normandeau a Duty of Care on the Facts of This 
Case-
Hanson tries to reduce this case to a single, abstract proposition, namely, 
that a repair shop does not owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver.21 Hanson 
argues that it does not have such a duty because the relationship between a 
repair shop and a tow truck driver is too attenuated, and any harm to a tow truck 
driver resulting from a negligent repair is unforeseeable. By framing the issue 
this way, Hanson tries to avoid one of the central facts of this case, namely, that 
Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck's hydraulic line did not just cause 
the truck to break down, requiring the services of a tow truck driver, but also 
created the very hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. For that reason, Hanson's 
assertion that "[t]he mere furnishing of the necessity of needing a repair person is 
See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 1, 2, 5,16. 
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not sufficient to impose a duty"22 is irrelevant, since Hanson's negligence did 
much more than that. 
The issue before the trial court was not the abstract issue of whether a 
repair shop owes a duty to a tow truck driver but whether Hanson owed a duty 
of care to Mr. Normandeau under the facts of this case. 
Hanson claims that the plaintiffs' only claim against it was that it 
negligently repaired the truck, causing the truck "to break down under 
circumstances that required it to be towed."23 In fact, the plaintiffs claimed that 
that was just one of the ways in which Hanson and the other defendants were 
negligent. (R. 190-91, % 59 (the defendants' negligence "included, but is not limited 
to," certain enumerated acts) (emphasis added).) The evidence developed 
22
 Id. at 8 (citing Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App.), 
review denied (Cal. 1995), and Sanders v. Posi-Seal Int'l, 668 So.2d 742 (La. Ct. App.), 
writ denied, 672 So.2d 924 (La. 1996)). In Bryant, the defendant's negligence in 
driving while intoxicated only put the plaintiffs decedent (a tow truck driver) in 
a position where he was injured by the independent negligence of another driver. 
Other than making it more probable that the decedent would be in the place 
where the accident occurred, the defendant's negligence had nothing to do with 
the accident. See 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295, 296. Sanders is also distinguishable. That 
case involved the question of whether one repairperson owes a duty to a 
subsequent repairperson hired to make the repaired part "like new." See 668 
So.2d at 747. Mr. Normandeau was not hired to repair Hanson's shoddy work 
but was only hired to tow the truck to a place where the part could be repaired. 
23
 Appellant's Br. at 4; see also R. 190-91, at \ 59(c). 
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through discovery showed that Hanson's negligent repair of the truck not only 
caused the truck to break down on the side of the road, requiring that it be 
towed, but also caused the parking brake to clamp down on the drive line while 
the drive line was turning. Hanson's negligence not only brought the truck to a 
stop but also caused a huge amount of unseen torque to build up in the drive 
line, which was violently released when Mr. Normandeau tried to prepare the 
truck for towing. (See, e.g., R. 807-09, f l 3-12.) Thus, Hanson's negligent repair 
of the hose created the very hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. 
Hanson claims that, under "traditional negligence analysis," a vehicle 
repair shop owes no duty of care to a tow truck driver.24 Hanson also claims that 
the plaintiffs "do not state what legal duty was owed to" their decedent.25 
In fact, traditional negligence law shows that Hanson owed Mr. 
Normandeau a duty of care. The duty Hanson owed to Mr. Normandeau is the 
duty that all people owe to others~a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing 
Appellants' Br. at 5. 
Id. at 6. 
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them harm: 'The default rule is that everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to 
others to avoid physical harms/'26 
26
 1 D A N B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (Supp. 2008) (footnote 
omitted). See also id. § 117, at 277 (2001) (as a general rule, all people owe a duty 
"to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person 
under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to 
others") (footnotes omitted); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In the usual run of cases, a general duty to avoid negligence is 
assumed, and there is no need for the court to undertake detailed analysis of 
precedent and policy.") (citations omitted), vacated, 264 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2001), and 
effectively overruled on the merits by Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 
1055 (N.Y. 2001); Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 256 (Cal. 2001) 
("Under general negligence principles, . . . a person ordinarily is obligated to 
exercise due care in his or her own actions so as to not create an unreasonable 
risk of injury to others"); Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal. 
1994) ("We all have the duty to use due care to avoid injuring others.") (citation 
omitted); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 262-23 (Mass. 2004) ("As a general 
principle of tort law, every actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid 
physical harm to others."); Iglehart v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 OK 76,110, 
60 P.3d 497 (recognizing ''the traditional common-law rule that whenever one 
person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another, that, 
if he . . . did not use ordinary care and skill in his . . . own conduct, he would 
cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use 
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger"); Wolford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795 
P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990) ("As a general rule a 'defendant owes a duty of care to 
all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all 
risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous/") (citations omitted). 
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. b 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Ordinarily, an actor whose conduct creates risks of 
physical harm to others has a duty to exercise reasonable care."). Cf Palsgrafv. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Every 
one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others."). 
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Courts usually constrict this general duty of care in very limited 
circumstances:27 
(1) when the plaintiff claims economic or dignitary harm, not 
personal injury or property damage; (2) when the defendant is 
perceived as having committed no relevant affirmative act; (3) when 
the defendant's duty is thought to be based upon his special 
relationship or undertaking; (4) when a duty to the plaintiff would 
potentially conflict with a preexisting duty to another; and (5) when 
the courts believe they know that the plaintiff has consented to some 
inherent risk in dealing with the defendant.28 
None of these situations exist in this case. The plaintiffs were not claiming 
economic or dignitary harm; the harm they suffered was the death of their 
husband and father. The defendant's liability was not based on its failure to act 
but on its affirmative acts in negligently repairing the hydraulic line on the Ryder 
truck. The defendant's duty was not based on a special relationship.29 
27
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 6 
(Discussion Draft Apr. 5,1999) ("Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based 
on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify the 
withholding of liability/'). 
28
 1 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 227 (Supp. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
Although courts sometime say that the defendant owed the plaintiff "no duty" in 
such cases, "they usually mean only that the defendant owed no duty that was 
breached or that he owed no duty that was relevant on the facts." Id. 
29
 For that reason, the special relationship cases that Hanson relied on 
before the trial court {see R. 627-28) and in point LC of its brief are irrelevant. See 
Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, % 21 ("in this case, there is no specific relationship test 
to be applied to determine whether Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty"). 
19 
Recognizing that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty would not conflict with 
a preexisting duty to anyone else but is consistent with the duties that Hanson 
admits it owed to others. And Mr. Normandeau did not consent to any inherent 
risk in dealing with Hanson. 
Hanson claims that, "[i]n wrestling with whether a duty was owed in this 
case, the Utah Supreme Court provided some guidance to the analysis of when a 
duty is created/730 The Utah Supreme Court did not "wrestle" with whether a 
duty was owed in this case. It left that issue for this court to decide. It merely 
held that Hanson had properly preserved the issue for appeal. 
The supreme court did say, however: "A court determines whether a duty 
exists by analyzing [1] the legal relationship between the parties, [2] the 
f oreseeability of injury, [3] the likelihood of injury, [4] public policy as to which 
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and [5] other general policy 
The specific relationship cases apply when the plaintiff is claiming that the 
defendant is liable for failing to perform a gratuitous undertaking or failing to 
control the conduct of a third person. See, e.g., Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 
80, % 10,125 P.3d 906; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 12, topic 7, scope note 
(1963 & 1964). Those are not the plaintiffs' claims in this case. The plaintiffs' 
claim is that Hanson's own negligence in performing a task for which it was 
compensated (see R. 116, % 15, & 118) caused the death of their husband and 
father. 
30
 Appellant's Br. at 6. 
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considerations/'31 All of those factors support the trial court's conclusion that 
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty on the facts of this case. 
1. The Legal Relationship Between the Parties. 
The fact that Hanson and Mr. Normandeau did not have a preexisting 
relationship does not mean that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau no duty of care. 
The existence of a relationship between the parties "is usually one of the grounds 
for imposing a duty of reasonable care, but the absence of a relationship is usually not 
a ground for ruling out a duty of care. "32 
Negligence law, as originally developed at common law, was initially 
reserved for consented-to contacts that went awry. Thus, it originally involved 
parties who had some relationship to each other, by contract or status.33 But by 
31
 2009 UT 44, % 19 (citing AMS Salt Indus. Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
Am., 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997)). Professor Dobbs has noted that such factors, 
variously stated by different courts, "are so numerous and so broadly stated that 
they can lead to almost any conclusion.... More importantly,... they are 
mainly the very same factors that determine the negligence question." 1 DOBBS, 
supra note 26, § 229, at 583 (2001). Professor Dobbs concludes: "Given the 
similarity between the duty factors decided by the judge and the negligence 
factors decided by the jury, it may be appropriate to wonder whether judges are 
in a position to shape refined limited duty rules without taking over the jury 
role." Id. 
32
 1 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 229, at 179 (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). 
33
 See generally id. § 111 (2001). 
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the 1800s, negligence law had been extended to strangers, and "the negligence 
standard necessarily cease[d] to arise from the parties' relationship."34 Thus, as 
Hanson conceded at the hearing on its motion for summary judgment, Hanson 
could be liable to the occupants of the vehicle, to other motorists, to pedestrians, 
and to owners of other vehicles parked on the side of the road—all people with 
whom Hanson had no relationship—if its negligent repair caused the driver of the 
truck to lose control over the vehicle. (R. 629 & R. 2078, at 34:11-20,41:14-42:1.) 
In any event, there was a relationship between Hanson and Mr. 
Normandeau-that of a repairer of a chattel and one whom the repairer should 
expect to use it or be endangered by its probable use. 
The law is well settled that one who repairs a product owes a duty to those 
who could foreseeably be injured by a negligent repair.35 And, as explained in 
34
 Id. at 262. 
35
 E.g., Winans v. Rockwell lut'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449,1453 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(repairers of products are required to use reasonable care in proportion to the 
foreseeable danger) (applying Louisiana law); Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 
F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1950) ("the rule of liability has been made generally 
applicable to one who, as an independent contractor negligently . . . repairs a 
chattel for another") (citations omitted); Levine v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 200 F. Supp. 
2d 180,186-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (a person who undertakes repairs has a duty of 
care to act reasonably to protect against foreseeable risks) (applying New York 
law); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160,169 (Ct. App. 2002) 
("An independent contractor repairer may owe a duty to a third party injured by 
22 
the next section, Mr. Normandeau was someone who could foreseeably be 
injured by a negligent repair. 
the equipment repaired if . . . the repairer negligently performs the repair causing 
the third party's injury"); Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 20 CaL Rptr. 2d 913, 
(Ct. App.) (contractor who failed to maintain the electrical system of a truck, 
causing the truck driver to have to stop by the side of the road, where he was hit 
and killed by another car, owed a duty of care to the driver), review denied (CaL 
1993); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 46 S.E.2d 197, 200 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948) ("an 
independent contractor who repairs an article or machine" "owes an original 
duty . . . not to endanger the lives and limbs of others by the negligent 
performance of a contract, when the consequences of such conduct may be 
foreseen"); Central & S. Truck Lines v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841, 
844-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (independent contractors can be liable to third parties 
for negligent repairs to motor vehicles) (citations omitted); Zierer v. Daniels, 122 
A.2d 377, 378-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) ("he who repairs a chattel is 
bound to exercise reasonable care not to cause bodily harm or damage to one 
whose person or property may reasonably be expected to be endangered by the 
probable use of the chattel after the making of the repair"; "[ujnder this rule, one 
who negligently repairs an automobile at the request of the owner had been held 
liable to a third person."); Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993, 997 (Okla. 
1968) (a repairer owes a duty to foreseeable users of the product to perform the 
repairs properly). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 404 (one who 
negligently repairs a chattel is subject to the same liability as a negligent 
manufacturer of the chattel); 395 (one who negligently manufactures a chattel 
that is dangerous unless carefully made is subject to liability to those who use it 
for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those 
whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use); 398 (a 
manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design that makes it dangerous 
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he 
should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its probable use). 
23 
2. The Foreseeability of Injury 
Hanson's main argument before the trial court was that the injury to Mr. 
Normandeau was not foreseeable. (E.g., R. 2078, at 33:25-34:2 ('There really 
aren't any other factors to consider in this case as to whether a duty was owed, 
except for the foreseeability."). What is required to be foreseeable is the general 
nature of the harm, not the specific mechanism of the harm or the particular 
accident.36 
Hanson conceded that it was foreseeable that, if it did a negligent repair, 
the hose would fail and that the truck would go into "self-preservation" mode 
and pull over to the side of the road (R. 2078, at 34:3-10); that the vehicle would 
have to be towed (R. 2078, at 35:1-14, 42:16-17); that, before it could be towed, the 
drive line would have to be disconnected (R. 2078, at 35:15-19, 36:4-8); and that, 
because of the way the truck was designed, there could be substantial torque on 
the drive line (R. 2078, at 36:9-18). As an authorized dealer, supplier, and 
36
 Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, f 20. See also Bigbee v. Pacific Tel & Tel Co., 
665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983) ("'foreseeability is not to be measured by what is 
more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of 
modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in 
guiding practical conduct.... One may be held accountable for creating even 
'"the risk of a slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent [person] would 
not do so."'") (citations omitted). 
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repairer of the type of truck involved in this case (e.g., R. 2082, at 122:18-123:7; R. 
2078, at 48:23-49:2), Hanson knew or should have known that a negligent repair 
of the hose would cause excessive torque to build up in the drive line. 
The only thing that Hanson claimed was unforeseeable was that Mr. 
Normandeau would not do his job right by checking for and releasing the built-
up torque in the drive line before trying to tow the truck. (See R. 2078, at 34:18-
25; 37:11-22; 42:19-22, 51:21-24.) There were disputed issues of material fact as to 
whether Mr. Normandeau was or should have been aware of the tremendous 
additional torque that would be present in the drive line as a result of Hanson's 
negligent repair (see, e.g., R. 813-14, %% 5-12) and whether he checked for and 
tried to release the torque in the drive line before towing the vehicle (see R. 814, 
%% 10 & 12; 831-39; 846-51), precluding summary judgment on that ground. The 
trial court properly let that issue go to the jury, and the jury found against 
Hanson on that issue. It found that Mr. Normandeau was not negligent in the 
way he went about his job. (See R. 1683,15.) In any event, a subsequent 
negligent (or even criminal) act of another is not unforeseeable as a matter of 
37
 E.g., Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252,1255-57 
(Utah 1996); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1985); Godesky v. Provo 
25 
3. The Likelihood of Injury 
Hanson's negligence increased the likelihood of injury to someone in Mr. 
Normandeau's position, that is, the chance that he would be injured.38 
For purposes of its summary judgment motion, Hanson did not dispute 
that its repair of the hose in the Ryder truck was negligent. (See, e.g., R. 631.) 
Hanson's negligent repair caused the truck's hydraulic line to leak, and the loss 
of hydraulic fluid not only caused the truck to lose power steering but also 
caused the drive-line parking brake to engage, which stopped the drive line from 
turning and caused torque to build up in the drive line. Because of Hanson's 
negligent repair, the truck had to be towed. And before he could tow the truck, 
Mr. Normandeau had to disengage the drive line. The substantial built-up and 
unseen torque in the drive line created a significant risk of harm to anyone 
working on or near the drive line. (See R. 808-09, Tl 8-13.) It was "very, very 
common" for a tow-truck driver to try to remove the drive line the way Mr. 
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 
217, 222 (Utah 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 447-49. 
38
 See, e.g., Cambridge Dictionaries Online ("likelihood" means "the 
chance that something will happen"), on-line at 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=46204&dict=CALD (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2009). 
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Normandeau did. (R. 847, % 31; 908, at 102:4-12.) Thus, injury to someone in Mr. 
Normandeau' s place was more likely than an injury to others to whom Hanson 
conceded it owed a duty—the occupants of the vehicle and other motorists. 
4. Public Policy as to Which Party Can Best Bear the Loss 
Hanson argues: 
To extend a duty of care to a tow truck driver due to negligent 
repairs made by a mechanic would essentially burden mechanics 
shop[s] with the obligation to compensate tow truck drivers for 
injuries suffered while doing their job. Repair shops are not insurers 
of tow truck drivers—to operate, towers are required to purchase 
hefty insurance policies for their hazardous jobs, and the onus of 
responsibility for following proper procedure is best placed on 
them.39 
To find that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty in this case would not 
make repair shops insurers for tow truck drivers any more than finding that a 
repair shop that negligently fixes a car's brakes is an insurer for all other 
motorists and pedestrians on the road. In each case, the repair shop is only liable 
for the injuries its negligence proximately causes. That is the public policy behind 
tort law—to hold tortfeasors accountable for the harm caused by their own fault.40 
39
 Appellant's Br. at 9. 
40
 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-5-818 & -820. See also, e.g., State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. ofS.E., 631 So.2d 30, 32 (La. Ct. App.) ("To 
place the primary liability for an accident upon the party who is the most 
27 
Public policy dictates that, as between a negligent tortfeasor and an innocent 
plaintiff, the loss should fall on the tortfeasor.41 
There is absolutely no evidence or foundation for Hanson's bald assertion 
that "towers are required to purchase hefty insurance policies for their hazardous 
jobs," and Hanson cites no authority for its assertion. Similarly, there is no 
evidence that Mr. Normandeau was covered by insurance. If his employer was 
in fact "required to purchase hefty insurance policies" covering its towing 
operations, that insurance would not have provided coverage for Mr. 
Normandeau or his heirs. Their exclusive remedy against Mr. Normandeau's 
employer is workers' compensation.42 
Moreover, whatever liability insurance Mr. Normandeau's employer may 
have had would not have covered harm caused by Hanson's fault. 
responsible for the loss and who was in the best position to have avoided the 
incident could be considered sound public policy which encourages the negligent 
party to exercise due care.") (citation omitted), writ denied, 635 So.2d 1108 (La. 
1994); Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401,404 (Tex. 2009) ("'the 
public policy behind the law of negligence . . . dictates every person is 
responsible for injuries which are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of his 
act or omission'") (citation omitted). 
41
 See Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, % 17,171 P.3d 411 (referring to 
"the foundational tort law principle that, as between an innocent party and a 
negligent one the loss should fall on the negligent party"). 
42
 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105(l). 
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If the existence of insurance for the death of Mr. Normandeau is relevant at 
all, it favors finding a duty on the part of Hanson. While there was no evidence 
that Mr. Normandeau's employer was heavily insured, Hanson is fully insured 
for its liability to the plaintiffs.43 
But the existence or nonexistence of insurance here is irrelevant. In a case 
like this the law does not take into consideration whether or not the plaintiff had 
insurance in holding wrongdoers accountable for the harm they have caused.44 
Taken to its logical extreme, Hanson's argument would mean that no driver 
would owe any duty of care to any other driver on the road because all drivers 
are required to buy insurance for the hazardous activity of driving a car.45 
See Def. Hanson Equip. Inc/s Mem. in Supp. of Its Mot. to Stay 
Execution of Judg't Pending Appeal, filed Apr. 30, 2007, and included in vol. 5 of 
the Record, at 2, % 2 ("Defendant Hanson Equipment is insured with Harco 
National Insurance Company, and the amount of the judgment was within 
Hanson Equipment's insurance policy limit/'). 
44
 See, e.g., DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) (a defendant 
cannot avoid liability on the ground that the damage he caused has been paid by 
insurance; the collateral source rule "provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to 
have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has 
received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an 
independent collateral source"). 
45
 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-12a-301(2)-(4) & -103(9). 
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Hanson's argument that "the onus of responsibility for following proper 
procedure is best placed on" tow truck drivers is similarly unavailing. The 
plaintiffs are not trying to hold Hanson liable for any harm caused by Mr. 
Normandeau not "following proper procedure." Whatever harm Mr. 
Normandeau caused himself is not Hanson's responsibility.46 In any event, the 
jury found that Mr. Normandeau was not at fault in causing his death but that 
Hanson bore sole responsibility for his death. (R. 1683, % 7.) 
In short, public policy does not demand that, as between a negligent 
tortfeasor who is fully insured for any liability and the widow and children of the 
man killed by the tortfeasor's negligence, the widow and children "can best bear 
the loss occasioned by the injury."47 
5. Other General Policy Considerations 
Hanson has not identified any other policy considerations that would 
justify shifting responsibility for its negligence from Hanson, the tortfeasor, to 
Mr. Normandeau's widow and children, and the plaintiffs are not aware of any. 
See id. §§ 78B-5-818 & -820. 
See Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, % 19. 
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B. Hanson's "Case on Point" Is Not. 
Hanson claims that Reimer v. City of Crookston48 is ''on point" in holding 
that a prior repair shop owes no duty of care to subsequent mechanics. 
Curiously, if Hanson thought Reimer was "on point," one would have thought 
that it would have cited it more than in a single, passing "See, e.g.," reference in 
the six briefs it has already filed on appeal (two in this court the first time 
around, its petition for writ of certiorari and reply, and its brief and reply brief in 
the Utah Supreme Court).49 As Hanson itself recognizes,50 Reimer is 
distinguishable on its facts. 
In that case, Mr. Reimer, a boiler repair expert, was badly burned when he 
accidentally brushed up against a corroded nipple on a school swimming pool 
boiler and the nipple broke off, spraying Mr. Reimer with pressurized hot water 
and steam. Mr. Reimer sued, among others, Johnson Controls, a company that 
had performed previous maintenance services on the boiler. However, none of 
48
 326 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2003). 
49
 See Appellant's Br., Jan. 19, 2007, at 17 (citing Reimer for the 
proposition that the "fact that on occasion defendant would do work on [a] boiler 
does not create a duty on its part to anyone down the line who may be harmed 
by the boiler"). 
50
 See Appellant's Br., Oct. 26, 2009, at 10. 
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those repairs involved the corroded nipple—the part that broke.51 In fact, earlier 
that day, the head custodian for the school had asked a Johnson employee to 
tighten the nipple, and the employee refused because the nipple was corroded 
and appeared unsafe; moreover, it was not part of his contract-related 
maintenance work.52 The court held that Johnson Controls could not be liable 
because it was not responsible for the corroded nipple that broke.53 Hanson 
concedes as much, but claims "this is of no consequence/'54 
Unlike Hanson's repair in this case, Johnson Controls' work in Reimer had 
nothing to do with the part that failed and did not directly cause the failure. It 
would take a major extension of tort law to hold a repairman liable in negligence 
for the failure of a part it had nothing to do with. Hanson, on the other hand, was 
responsible for the part that broke (the hose that carried the hydraulic fluid for 
the parking brake and power steering). Hanson's negligent repair caused the 
51
 See 326 F.3d at 965 ("It is undisputed that the contract did not 
include repair or maintenance of the boiler nipples nor did Johnson Controls ever 
work on the nipple that caused Mr. Reimer's injury"). 
52
 See id. at 960. 
53
 See id. at 965-66. 
54
 Appellants' Br. at 10 ("Johnson Controls' repairman never worked 
on the part that broke and caused injury, but this is of no consequence."). 
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hose to fail, which directly caused drive-line torque to build up and also required 
that the drive line be disconnected. The jury found that Hanson's negligent 
repair was the proximate cause of Mr. Normandeau's death. 
Other courts have had little trouble recognizing that one who repairs a 
product owes a duty to those who could foreseeably be injured by a negligent 
repair.55 
II. 
HANSON HAS WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT BASED ON 
THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE. 
Hanson argues that the so-called professional rescuer doctrine is 
"[a]nalagous" [sic] to this case.56 Hanson is precluded from even making this 
argument. 
Hanson never raised the professional rescuer doctrine as an affirmative 
defense. (See R. 304-18.) In moving for summary judgment, Hanson never 
mentioned the professional rescuer doctrine, either in its briefs or in its oral 
argument. (See R. 612-37; 2078.) Although Utah had not officially adopted the 
See supra note 35 and authorities cited therein. 
Appellants' Br. at 12. 
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professional rescuer doctrine at that time, it was a well-recognized doctrine of 
tort law that Hanson could have argued for.57 
After the case was tried to a jury and a judgment was entered, Hanson 
moved for a new trial or for a remittitur but did not raise the professional rescuer 
doctrine in its post-judgment motion either. (See R. 1692-94.) After the plaintiffs 
had responded to that motion and after the time for moving for a new trial had 
passed,58 Hanson filed, without leave of court, a "Supplemental Briefing in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial/' raising for the first time the 
issue of the professional rescuer doctrine (see R. 1847-52), even though it had 
nothing to do with any of the grounds that Hanson had moved for a new trial on 
57
 See Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, J 10,131 P.3d 280 ('Tor 
over a century, this rule has been adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions 
that have considered it."), aff'd, 2007 UT 74,171 P.3d 411. See also Fordham, 2007 
UT 74, % 22 (Wilkins, Assoc. C.J., concurring & dissenting) (noting that the 
concept first arose in 1892, in Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182 (111. 1892), overruled by 
Dim v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (111. I960)). 
58
 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(b) (a motion for new trial must be served 
within 10 days after entry of the judgment). 
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(cf. R. 1692-94).59 The trial court denied Hanson's motion on the merits, finding 
the doctrine inapplicable in this case. (See R. 2024-25, Tl 29-34.) 
Hanson appealed. In its docketing statement on appeal, Hanson stated one 
of the issues for appeal as, "Does the professional rescuer doctrine, adopted by 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50,131 P.3d 280, 
certorari [sic] granted 138 P.3d 589, bar plaintiffs claims against Hanson?"60 
Curiously, however, Hanson never mentioned the doctrine again until it filed its 
latest brief, after remand from the Utah Supreme Court. Hanson had eight 
opportunities to raise the doctrine after mentioning it in its docketing statement, 
but it never did—not in its opening brief in this court, not in its reply brief in this 
court, not at oral argument in this court, not in its petition for a writ of certiorari, 
not in its reply brief on its petition for a writ of certiorari, not in its principal brief 
in the Utah Supreme Court, not in its reply brief in the Utah Supreme Court, and 
59
 Cf. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 4,27 F.2d 1273,1276 
(3d Cir. 1970) (a court is without authority to grant a new trial for reasons 
assigned after the mandatory 10-day period for moving for a new trial under rule 
59(b)); Brest v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 24 F.R.D. 47,48 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ("it is plain 
that under [rule 59(b)]... additional reasons for a new trial served later than ten 
days have no effect and cannot be considered by the Court"). 
60
 Docketing Statement at 3, i (c)(7)(iii). 
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not at oral argument in the Utah Supreme Court. Hanson's efforts to resurrect 
the issue now are too little too late. 
It is well established that issues not properly raised in the trial court may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal,61 and "reference to an issue in post-trial 
motions is insufficient to raise an issue not previously raised/'62 Moreover, issues 
not raised in the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari to the supreme 
court;63 and issues not previously raised on appeal may not be raised on 
remand.64 As the Federal Circuit has explained, appellate courts sit to review 
judgments, not opinions: 
This responsibility can be properly discharged only if the court 
assumes that the appellant has fully set forth its attack on the 
judgment below . . . . In other words, the court is entitled to assume 
that an appellant has raised all issues it deems important against a 
judgment appealed from. An issue that falls within the scope of the 
61
 E.g., State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
62
 LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479,484 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
63
 E.g., DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995). 
64
 See supra note 3 and cases cited therein. 
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judgment appealed from but is not raised by the appellant in its 
opening brief on appeal is necessarily waived.65 
'To hold otherwise/' the court explained, 
would allow appellants to present appeals in a piecemeal and 
repeated fashion, and would lead to the untenable result that "a 
party who has chosen not to argue a point on a first appeal should 
stand better as regards the law of the case than one who had argued 
and lost/'66 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) requires the argument section of 
a brief on appeal to "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Hanson never raised the professional rescuer 
doctrine in any of its briefs on appeal. It has therefore waived the issue.67 To 
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379,1383 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
66
 Id. at 1382-83 (quoting Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100,109 (2d Cir. 
1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982)). 
67
 Cf. Guttman v. New Mexico, 325 Fed. Appx. 687, 693 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(even though Younger abstention may be raised for the first time on appeal, the 
defendant waived its abstention argument by not raising it when it had 
"numerous opportunities" to do so on appeal); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 
n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (appellant waived appellate review of issues and arguments 
that were insufficiently raised in its opening brief) (applying Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(9)(A), which is substantively the same as Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)); Utah 
Environmental Congress v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184,1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (even 
where an issue is mentioned in a brief on appeal, it is waived if not substantively 
addressed); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (issues not raised on 
37 
allow Hanson to now argue the professional rescuer doctrine would allow it to 
"present its appeals in a piecemeal and repeated fashion/' hoping that the third 
time around will be the charm. Hanson, who chose not to argue the point on its 
first appeal or to raise it in the Utah Supreme Court, should not be allowed to 
stand in a better position than it would have been in had it properly raised it 
before and lost. 
III. 
THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THIS CASE IN ANY EVENT. 
Hanson apparently concedes that the professional rescuer doctrine does 
not apply in this case, since it argues only that it is "[a]nalagous" [sic].68 That is 
because, in adopting the professional rescuer doctrine in Utah, the Utah Supreme 
Court limited its application to "professional rescuers who, like firefighters and 
appeal in the court of appeals and that the court did not address may not be 
raised on certiorari unless the issue arose out of the court of appeals' decision); 
Ong Ml (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,445 n.31 (Utah 1993) 
(refusing to reach new points raised for the first time on appeal and declining to 
honor the distinction between "new arguments as opposed to new issues"). 
68
 Appellants' Br. at 12. 
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police officers, are public employees/'69 Mr. Normandeau was not a public 
employee. 
The rule also does not apply for another reason. As Hanson notes, the 
professional rescuer rule "'bars those engaged in rescue work as part of their 
employment from recovering damages for injuries sustained on the job as a result 
of the negligence of the person rescued.'"70 As the Utah Supreme Court noted in 
adopting the rule, one policy reason in favor of the rule is that the law should not 
discourage imperiled citizens from summoning aid.71 That rationale does not 
help Hanson because Hanson was not the party in need of rescuing or the party 
who summoned Mr. Normandeau. The person rescued was Kristen Marion, the 
person who rented and drove the truck, not Hanson. 
Hanson argues that, because Mr. Normandeau's "chosen profession is 
inherently dangerous," the professional rescuer doctrine should extend to him as 
well.72 Yet, as Hanson also notes, "[o]ther inherently dangerous professions 
69
 Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74,114,171 P.3d 411 (noting that "it is 
not necessary to do more to reach the result in this case"). 
70
 Appellant's Br. at 12 (emphasis added) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D 
Negligence § 782 (2004)). 
71
 See 2007 UT 74,18. 
72
 Appellant's Br. at 13-14. 
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include roofers, electricians, pilots, farmers, and construction workers, to name a 
few/'73 Hanson's argument would mean that anyone who called any of these 
other professionals for help would not owe them a duty either. That is not the 
law.74 If an electrician, roofer, or pilot, for example, is injured through another's 
negligence, the other is subject to liability to him or her. It should be no different 
for a tow truck driver. 
Hanson argues that tow truck drivers are surrounded by vehicles moving 
at high speeds and are subject to inclement weather, poor road conditions, and 
working in the dark at nighttime, "just like highway patrolmen are."75 But while 
inclement weather and vehicles moving too fast for conditions caused the state 
trooper's injuries in Fordham, none of those "hazardous working conditions" had 
anything to do with Mr. Normandeau's death. The hazard that killed him was 
not the result of bad weather or other drivers but of Hanson's negligent repair. 
73
 Id. at 14. 
74
 See, e.g., Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal. 1994) 
("The duty to avoid injuring others normally extends to those engaged in 
hazardous work. Thus, for example, both publicly and privately employed 
highway workers, who face the obvious occupational hazard of working in the 
middle of traffic, may recover for injuries caused by a third party's negligent 
driving.") (citations omitted). 
75
 Appellant's Br. at 14. 
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Hanson argues that, in these "hazardous jobs/' "the pay reflects the 
hazards undertaken and expensive workers compensation benefits are 
provided."76 Again, Hanson has pointed to no evidence that Mr. Normandeau 
was highly compensated for having to face hazards, nor was there any evidence 
of "expensive workers compensation benefits." In fact, workers' compensation 
benefits are set by statute and represent a trade-off: the worker or his family 
receives less than one might expect from a tort recovery in exchange for a speedy 
recovery and being relieved of the responsibility of having to prove that the 
employer was at fault.77 In any event, the supreme court held in Fordham that the 




 See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 
124,140 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting) (one of the early workers7 compensation 
acts—that governing longshoremen—was opposed by many workers at first 
because they lost "their chance to get big tort verdicts"; but "Congress thought it 
best to give them a more certain and less expensive recovery, even though far 
less in amount than some tort recoveries might be"); Workers' Compensation Fund 
v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, f 8, 210 P.3d 277 (the purpose of workers' 
compensation is to provide compensation to injured employees by a simple and 
speedy procedure that eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in proving 
fault). 
78
 See 2007 UT 74, ^16. 
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What the court in Fordham did find significant was the nature of the 
relationship between public servants such as police officers and fire fighters on 
the one hand and members of the public on the other hand: "The nature of the 
rescuer-rescued relationship is one that contemplates allocation of costs across 
society generally for injuries sustained by professional rescuers/'79 "Notably," 
the court added, 
the consequences for an injured professional rescuer who is a public 
employee may be less unfair than those that would befall a private 
party . . . because responsible citizens can, and should, see to it that 
their public officials fairly compensate those firefighters, police 
officers, and others who are called upon to confront hazards as part 
of their callings.80 
The cost of injuries to employees of private towing businesses are not allocated 
"across society generally," the way they are for public servants like police officers 
and firefighters. Private tow truck drivers are not "fairly compensate[d]" by 
public officials. Extending the professional rescuer doctrine to Mr. Normandeau 
would be unfair because it would leave his heirs at the mercy of private charity 
while Hanson, the tortfeasor, who has more than sufficient liability insurance to 
pay for the damage it has caused, would escape responsibility for its actions. 
79




As Hanson notes, the court in Fordham barred Fordham's claims since "all 
Oldroyd did [was] cause the need for the services of a rescuer/'81 Hanson then 
claims "all that can be said [about it] is that the bad repair by Hanson Equipment 
caused the need for a tow truck operator to tow" the truck.82 In fact, Hanson's 
negligence did more than just cause the need for a tow truck; it created the very 
hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. There was no question in Fordham that the 
driver of the car that actually struck Trooper Fordham could be liable for the 
injuries she caused.83 Similarly, if a police officer or a tow truck driver were 
injured by the fault of another after he arrived on the scene, such as if he were 
assaulted, robbed, run over, or had his vehicle hijacked, there is no question that 
the party who caused the harm would be liable to him. As the trial court 
correctly concluded: 
The professional rescuer doctrine also does not excuse 
Hanson's liability in this case because the evidence presented at trial 
supports the jury's finding that Hanson's negligence not only caused 
the [Ryder] truck to break down, requiring that it be towed, but also 
created the very hazard that materialized to kill Mr. Normandeau— 
81




 See Fordham, 2006 UT App 50,15, n.l (before filing the action against 
Oldroyd, Fordham settled with the driver of the vehicle that struck him for her 
insurance policy limits). 
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namely, the built-up torque in the driveline of the truck. The 
professional rescuer doctrine does not relieve a tortfeasor from 
liability where the tortfeasor's negligence directly caiused the 
plaintiffs harm. 
(R. 2025, % 34.) 
Finally, Hanson argues that California has applied the professional rescuer 
doctrine to tow truck drivers. California's experience in applying the doctrine to 
tow truck drivers shows why the doctrine should not apply in this case. 
In Holland v. Crumb,M a panel of the California Court of Appeals held that 
"the 'firefighter's rule' barjred] the claim of a privately employed tow truck 
driver who was injured during the normal discharge of his duties at the scene of 
a freeway automobile accident."85 The court based its holding on its view that 
the "application of the firefighter's rule depends on the inherent dangers 
associated with one's employment" and found that "the risk of being hit from 
passing traffic is inherent in the performance of the normal and usual duties of a 
tow truck driver rendering aid to inoperable cars which may be stranded on 
freeways or streets."86 
84
 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1994). 
85
 Id. at 366. 
86
 Id. at 369-70. 
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The California Supreme Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the court 
of appeals just three months later, in Neighborger v. Irwin Industries, Inc.87 Given 
the California Supreme Court's clear rejection of the rationale for Holland, the 
statement by another panel of the California Court of Appeals that Neighbarger 
"does not overrule the holding in Holland, "88 while perhaps technically correct, 
does not justify this court in following Holland.89 
The court in Neighbarger held that private safety employees could state a 
claim against a third party whose negligence started a fire that injured them. The 
court explored the public policy reasons for the firefighter's rule and concluded 
that the policy reasons for the rule in the context of public employees did not 
apply in the private sector. The fact that public and private safety officers are 
87
 882 P.2d 347, 356 n.4 (Cal. 1994) ("We . . . reject the reasoning of the 
court in Holland v. Crumb . . . applying the firefighter's rule to the claim of a 
privately employed tow truck driver on the theory that a tow truck driver must 
assume the foreseeable risks of such hazardous employment."). 
88
 Dyer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 88 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
89
 See id. at 89 ("Although the Neighbarger footnote leaves the holding 
in Holland intact, we decline to treat Holland as persuasive precedent."). Dyer 
itself is distinguishable because the tow-truck driver in that case had a contract-
based obligation to provide help to the defendant in case of a mechanical 
breakdown. See 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. Here, there was no contractual 
relationship between Hanson and Mr. Normandeau. 
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both employed "to confront and control hazards that may be created by the 
negligence of others" does not justify treating them the same: "the firefighter's 
rule was not intended to bar recovery for all hazards that are foreseeable in the 
employment context, but to eliminate the duty of care to a limited class of 
workers, the need for whose employment arises from certain inevitable risks that 
threaten the public welfare."90 As the court explained, a defendant stands in a 
different relation to a private safety worker than members of the public stand in 
relation to public servants: 
When the firefighter is publicly employed, the public, having 
secured the services of the firefighter by taxing itself, stands in the 
shoes of the person who hires a contractor to cure a dangerous 
condition. In effect, the public has purchased exoneration from the 
duty of care and should not have to pay twice, through taxation and 
through individual liability, for that service. [Citations omitted.] 
But when a safety employee is privately employed, a third party 
lacks the relationship that justifies exonerating him or her from the 
usual duty of care. The third party, unlike the public with its police 
and fire departments, has not provided the services of the private 
safety employee. Nor has the third party paid in any way to be 
relieved of the duty of care toward such a private employee. Having 
no relationship with the employee, and not having contracted for his 
or her services, it would not be unfair to charge the third party with 
the usual duty of care towards the private safety employee.91 
882 P.2d at 354 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 355. 
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Similarly, Hanson "lacks the relationship that justifies exonerating [it] from 
the usual duty of care." It did not provide or contract for Mr. Normandeau's 
services, nor did it pay "in any way to be relieved of [its] duty of care" toward 
Mr. Normandeau. Even if Mr. Normandeau were publicly compensated, as 
firefighters and police officers are, Hanson, as a foreign corporation not generally 
doing business in Utah (see R. 104, %% 7-12), would have contributed nothing 
towards that compensation. In short, Hanson was not a member of the public for 
whose benefit Mr. Normandeau allegedly was undertaking his services. 
The California court also noted that another justification for the rule-
namely, that it avoids "costly litigation over rights of subrogation without 
substantially benefiting the firefighter who is compensated either by the 
retirement system or the worker's compensation system"—does not apply to 
private plaintiffs: "Our concern to relieve various public agencies of the burden 
of lawsuits over rights of subrogation that are pointless because the public fisc 





Another contrast between public employees and private ones, such as Mr. 
Normandeau, is that "the latter does not receive the speciail pay, disability and 
retirement benefits that a public safety officer receives."93 
Finally, the court noted, the "substantial justifications for the firefighter's 
rule . . . based on the public nature of the service provided by firefighters and the 
relationship between the public and the public firefighter" simply do not apply to 
a private employee, such as Mr. Normandeau: 
Fire fighting is essentially a government function, and the public has 
undertaken the financial burden of providing it without liability to 
individuals who need it. Because of the relationship between the 
public, the firefighter, and those who require the services of the 
firefighter, the individual's usual duty of care towards the firefighter 
is replaced by the individual's contribution to tax-supported 
compensation for the firefighter. This relationship is missing 
between a privately employed safety employee and a third party. 
. . . ["]It is the public that hires, trains, and compensates fire 
fighters and police officers to confront danger. Basic to the public 
policy rationale underlying the fireman's rule is the spreading to the 
public of the costs of employing safety officers and of compensating 
them for any injuries they may sustain in the course of their 
employment. Tire fighters are present upon the premises [where 
they can be injured], not because of any private duty owed the 




 Id. at 357 (quoting Kowalski v. Gratopp, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1989)). 
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Thus, n[f]ire fighters and police officers are different than other employees whose 
occupations may peripherally involve hazards. Safety officers are employed, 
specially trained, and paid to confront dangerous situations for the protection of 
society/'95 Mr. Normandeau was not. He was not performing a government 
function that the public had undertaken the financial burden of providing 
without liability to those served but was doing a job for which those who 
benefited from his work would have to pay. 
In short, "when a private safety employee seeks to recover against a third 
party for negligently inflicted injuries, the relationship between the parties and 
considerations of the public good that justify a relaxation of the general duty of 
care for public firefighters are simply lacking."96 The court should therefore 
reject Hanson's invitation to absolve it of responsibility for its negligence, even if 
Hanson had properly preserved for appeal its argument that the so-called 
professional rescuer doctrine should apply in this case. 
Id. (quoting Kowalski, 442 N.W.2d at 684) (other citations omitted). 
Id. at 356. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly found that Hanson owed a duty of care to Mr. 
Normandeau under the facts of this case. There exists no good reason to relieve 
Hanson from liability for the harm its negligent repair of the Ryder truck caused. 
The court should therefore affirm the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of duty. 
DATED this day of 8th day of December, 2009. 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
By: Paul M. Simmons 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
(Original Signature) 
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Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis 
for such an award. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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PARRISH, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
i|l We granted certiorari on the question of whether the 
district court's denial of a pretrial motion for summary judgment 
is appealable after the trial has concluded and the jury has 
rendered its verdict and, if so, whether the pairty appealing the 
denial of the motion for summary judgement is required to reraise 
the basis for the motion during trial in order to preserve it for 
appeal. Regardless of whether the issue on which summary 
judgment was denied was reraised during trial, we hold that a 
party may appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment so 
long as the basis for the motion was purely legal. We 
accordingly reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
f2 Mr. Normandeau, a tow truck driver, was killed as he 
prepared a Ryder rental truck for towing. A faulty repair to the 
truck's hydraulic hose caused torque to build up in the 
driveline. As a result, when Mr. Normandeau disconnected the 
driveline in preparation for towing, a portion of the rear 
differential broke loose and struck his head, killing him 
instantly. His heirs (the "Normandeaus") sued Hanson Equipment 
("Hanson"), the company that had performed repairs to the 
hydraulic hose shortly before the accident. 
i[3 Prior to trial, Hanson moved for summary judgment, 
claiming that it owed no duty to Mr. Normandeau as a matter of 
law and that its prior repair of the truck was not the proximate 
cause of Mr. Normandeau's death. At the summary judgment 
hearing, the Normandeaus argued that the question of duty could 
be decided as a matter of law, and neither Hanson nor the judge 
disputed this assertion. Hanson claimed that it was not 
foreseeable that the built up tension in the driveline would kill 
a potential tow truck driver. Because there was a question of 
fact about whether the faulty repair was a foreseeable cause of 
Mr. Normandeau's death, the district court denied summary 
judgment. Although the district court was not clear during the 
summary judgment hearing or in its subsequent written order about 
whether the foreseeability question went to both duty and 
proximate cause or just proximate cause, the parties apparently 
understood that any disputed factual issues went to the question 
of causation rather than duty.1 At trial, the parties disputed 
1
 Indeed, our precedent is clear that the question of duty 
(continued...) 
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whether Hanson's repair to the truck was a proximate cause of Mr. 
Normandeau's injuries but did not raise the issue of whether 
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. The jury found for the 
Normandeaus and assigned Hanson all of the liability. 
f4 Hanson appealed the district court's denial of their 
pretrial summary judgment motion on the issue of duty. The court 
of appeals held that it could not review the ruling because 
Hanson did not litigate the issue at trial and failed to make a 
rule 50(b) motion for directed verdict on the issue. Normandeau 
v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2007 UT App 382, HU 13-14, 174 P.3d 1. 
The court of appeals explained that it could only review denials 
of pretrial summary judgment motions in cases where the litigant 
was foreclosed from raising at trial the basis for the motion. 
Id. (citing Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, f 20, 144 P.3d 1147) . 
We have jurisdiction to review the court of appeal's decision 
pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008). 
ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
i|5 We granted certiorari to address two questions: 
(1) whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and 
application of the rules governing appellate consideration of 
challenges to denials of summary judgment on direct appeal 
following entry of final judgment and (2) whether the court of 
appeals erred in its assessment of the effect of Hanson's failure 
to explicitly raise the issue of duty of care at trial after 
denial of its motion for summary judgment on that issue. 
1J6 "xOn certiorari, we review the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court 
correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review.'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 
f 12, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, H 8, 116 
P.3d 290). 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT COULD NOT 
REVIEW THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF HANSON'S PRETRIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION 
f7 Appellate courts may review the denial of a pretrial 
summary judgment motion if the motion was decided on purely legal 
grounds. We previously have held that "[i]n appealing a summary 
(...continued) 
is a purely legal issue. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were 
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal." 
Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, K 20, 144 P.3d 1147; see also 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ff 19-22, 136 P.3d 1252 
(reviewing the pretrial denial of a summary judgment motion based 
on the court's decision not to strike a supporting affidavit, a 
legal issue that would be foreclosed from litigation at trial). 
However, our case law has been less than clear in defining when 
appellate review of denials of summary judgment motions is 
precluded. For example, we have sometimes reviewed the denial of 
a summary judgment motion when the issue raised was not 
subsequently litigated at trial, even though parties were not 
explicitly foreclosed from reraising the issue. See Prince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, f 9, 94 P.3d 179 
(considering after trial whether the district court erred in 
denying plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the basis that no 
contract existed as a matter of law). But we have also held that 
if a party has "the opportunity to fully litigate the issues 
raised in the summary judgment motions," we will not review the 
court's denial of those motions. Wayment, 2006 UT 56, 1 19. 
f8 Given the lack of clarity in our prior case law, we 
first examine what standard the court of appeals should have 
applied in determining whether to review the denial of Hanson's 
summary judgment motion. We then apply the standard to the issue 
of duty in this case. 
A. Appellate Courts May Review Pretrial Denials of Summary 
Judgment Motions After Final Judgment Has Issued If the District 
Court Denied Summary Judgment on Purely Legal Grounds 
^9 On appeal, we will review a district court's denial of 
a summary judgment motion when the district court makes a legal 
ruling based on undisputed facts that do not maiterially change at 
trial. See Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). 
The district court must deny a motion for summary judgment if it 
finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact that bears 
on its legal determination or if it finds, as a matter of law 
based on the undisputed facts, that the moving party is not 
entitled to a legal ruling in its favor. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Because district courts are not required to specify the 
grounds on which they deny a motion for summary judgment, it may 
be difficult in some cases to ascertain whether the court denied 
a summary judgement motion based on the existence of a disputed 
material fact or as a result of a purely legal ruling. 
KlO This potential difficulty leads the Normandeaus to 
argue that this court should abandon our prior rulings allowing 
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us to review pretrial denials of summary judgment in favor of a 
bright line rule precluding all appellate review of such motions 
unless they are renewed at the conclusion of trial. 
Specifically, they argue that by allowing losing parties to 
appeal pretrial denials of summary judgment motions, appellate 
courts allow the summary judgment motion to become "a bomb 
planted within the litigation at its early stages and exploded on 
appeal." Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 835 
F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Feiger, Collison & 
Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1249-50 (Colo. 1996). 
til Although some jurisdictions have chosen to implement 
this bright line rule, others recognize that u[a] critical 
distinction exists between "summary judgment motions raising the 
sufficiency of the evidence to create a fact question for the 
jury and those raising a question of law that the court must 
decide.'" Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1229 
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ruvle v. Cont. Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837, 
842 (10th Cir. 1994)). For example, in order to prevent parties 
from challenging summary judgment motions on appeal that were 
denied due to disputed material facts rather than on purely legal 
grounds, the Eleventh Circuit will not review the denial of a 
pretrial summary judgment motion if xx (a) by trial the evidence 
produced by the opposing party was sufficient to be presented to 
the jury; or (b) by trial the evidence had been supplemented or 
changed in some manner favorable to the party who opposed summary 
judgment." Holley, 835 F.2d at 1377-78. This rule comports with 
our past appellate review of denied summary judgment motions. 
Hl2 In Estate Landscape, we reviewed a pretrial denial of a 
summary judgment motion when the pretrial judge made a legal 
ruling regarding accord and satisfaction that the trial judge 
declined to reconsider. 844 P.2d at 325. In that case, it would 
have been futile for the losing party to litigate accord and 
satisfaction at trial due to the earlier court ruling; no factual 
issue at trial would have affected the legal determination. 
Thus, we held that the denial of the earlier summary judgment 
motion, which had not thereafter been litigated at trial, was 
appealable. Id. at 325-26. 
Kl3 Similarly, in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler we reversed a 
jury verdict based on an improper denial of summary judgment even 
though the legal issue decided by the court denying the motion 
was not specifically foreclosed from being litigated at trial. 
2 004 UT 26, Uf 12-14. In that case, Prince Yeates sought summary 
judgment prior to the trial, arguing that under the undisputed 
material facts no contract existed between the parties as a 
matter of law. Id. %^ 7-9. The district court denied the 
motion. Id. When the case went to the jury, the court 
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instructed them that the plaintiffs' oral agreement with Prince 
Yeates was a valid express contract. Prince Yeates did not 
object to this instruction. Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant at 37, Prince, Yeates & Geldzaher v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 
94 P.3d 179 (No. 20020347). Although nothing in the denial of 
summary judgment suggested that Prince Yeats was foreclosed from 
litigating the existence of the contract at trial, we reviewed 
the pretrial legal ruling and reversed the jury verdict. Based 
on the undisputed facts presented in the summary judgment motion, 
which remained materially unchanged at trial, we held that the 
district court erred in determining that the vague oral agreement 
constituted an enforceable contract. Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler, 2004 UT 26, % 14. 
tl4 Purely legal issues are not decided by a trier of fact. 
Therefore, while we have stated that we review "only facts and 
legal theories that were foreclosed from being addressed at 
trial," Wayment, 2 006 UT 56, f 20, we do not require parties to 
reargue at trial legal issues that a trier of fact cannot decide. 
In both Estate Landscaping and Prince Yeates, the parties would 
not have benefitted from the opportunity to litigate the disputed 
legal issue at trial since both the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction and the existence of a contract in these cases were 
legal issues decided by the court. While the Prince Yeates 
litigants were not explicitly prevented from relitigating the 
existence of a contract, there would have been no benefit to 
doing so. Moreover, to allow review of pretrial denials of 
summary judgment only when a party is explicitly forbidden from 
reraising the legal issue at trial would preclude appellate 
consideration of nearly all pretrial denials of summary judgment 
motions because "reconsideration of an issue before a final 
judgment is within the sound discretion of the district court." 
IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc., 2008 UT 73, U 27, 196 
P.3d 588. 
Hl5 We therefore hold that when a court denies a motion for 
summary judgment on a purely legal basis, that is where the court 
denies the motion based on the undisputed facts, rather than 
because of the existence of a disputed material fact, the party 
denied summary judgment may challenge that denial on appeal. Any 
time "that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion 
to draw from the evidence or that the evidence adduced was simply 
insufficient to sustain the legal claim, then the trial court 
should rule on the issue as a matter of law." AMS Salt Indus. 
Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997). 
On the other hand, when disputed facts bear on the decision or 
when new material facts emerge at trial that change the nature of 
the legal determination, parties then have an obligation to 
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reraise the issue at trial in order to preserve it for appeal. 
See Hollev, 835 F.2d at 1377. 
i[l6 Because we hold that we may review a district court's 
denial of a summary judgment motion if the denial was based on a 
purely legal issue, we now analyze whether the district court's 
denial of Hanson's summary judgment motion is reviewable. 
B. The District Court Made a Legal Ruling Based on Undisputed 
Facts When It Denied Hanson's Summary Judgment Motion on the 
Issue of Whether Hanson Owed Mr. Normandeau a Duty of Care 
fl7 Because duty is a purely legal issue for the court to 
decide, the court of appeals erred when it determined that it 
could not review the pretrial denial of Hanson's summary judgment 
motion. The court of appeals held that it could not review the 
denial because duty of care is "heavily fact sensitive and is 
intertwined with the issue of foreseeability." Normandeau v. 
Hanson Equip., 2007 UT App 382, % 14, 174 P.3d 1. The court of 
appeals reasoned that the issue of foreseeability bears on both 
duty and proximate cause, and thus the district court could not 
have ruled on duty as a matter of law. Id. 
Il8 In contrast to the court of appeals' assertion that 
duty was submitted to the jury in the form of questions 
surrounding foreseeability, appellate courts have consistently 
held that n[t]he determination of whether a legal duty exists 
falls to the court." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 
% 14, 143 P.3d 283; see also Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 
H 8, 67 P.3d 1017 ("[W]hether a duty of care is owed is 'entirely 
a question of law to be determined by the court.'" (quoting 
Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992))); AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 319 (u[T]he question of 
whether a duty exists is a question of law." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Moreover, during the summary judgment hearing, 
the Normandeaus agreed that duty would be wdecided by the Court, 
as a matter of law" rather than by the jury. Consistent with the 
parties' understanding that a denial of summary judgment on the 
issue of duty was determined as a matter of law, the parties did 
not argue about duty at trial. Still, the Normandeaus argue that 
the question of whether Hanson owed a duty to the Normandeaus was 
dependent on whether the negligent repair caused Mr. Normandeau's 
death or whether he caused his own death by not checking for 
built up torque. Although this factual question does implicate 
the foreseeability of Mr. Normandeau's death, the specific 
mechanism of death is more properly an issue of proximate cause 
than one of duty. 
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^19 U'A duty, in negligence cases, may b€* defined as an 
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to 
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.'" 
AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 320-21 (quoting W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 
1984)). A court determines whether a duty exists by analyzing 
the legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of 
injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party 
can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other 
general policy considerations. Id. at 321. uLegal duty, then, 
is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships." 
Yazd, 2006 UT 47, *h 17; see also Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch, 1999 
UT 20, fK 9-10, 979 P.2d 317 (finding that a manufacturer had no 
duty as a matter of law to inform a consumer that a safer 
alternative to its product existed); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151-52 (Utah 1989) (finding that corrections officers owe no 
duty of care to the general public because it would be contrary 
to the public policy of promoting rehabilitative programs). 
120 Foreseeability as a factor in determining duty does not 
relate to the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct but 
rather to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor 
and the victim. ''Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context 
of determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of such 
harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm could be 
foreseen." Lee v. Farmer's Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 245 S.W.3d 
209, 212 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); see also Steffensen v. Smith's 
Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) ("What is necessary 
to meet the test of negligence . . . is that [the harm] be 
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would 
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of 
the same general nature." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
^21 At times, factual issues may bear on the issue of 
foreseeability as it relates to duty, but this is not such a 
case. The Normandeaus argue that the district court denied 
Hanson's motion for summary judgment on the issue of duty based 
on the extensive disputed material facts, relying on several Utah 
cases that have allowed the issue of foreseeability as it relates 
to duty to proceed to the jury. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1255-56 (Utah 1996); Steffensen, 
862 P.2d at 1346 (finding that jury instruction regarding 
foreseeability related primarily to proximate cause, though 
acknowledging that it could bear on negligences as well); Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc. 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978).2 For instance, 
2
 In Rees, we stated that when there is a dispute about the 
(continued...) 
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when parties disputed whether "special circumstances" existed to 
find that the owner of a car who left the key in its ignition had 
a duty to a couple injured when the car was stolen, the court 
allowed the jury to evaluate the facts. Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255-
56. If there were such "special circumstances," then the car 
owner owed the injured party a duty. Id. at 1256. But in this 
case, there is no specific relationship test to be applied to 
determine whether Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. Rather, the 
court had the undisputed facts necessary to examine "'the legal 
relationships between the parties . . . [and analyze] the duties 
created by these relationships.'" Yazd, 2006 UT 47, H ]« 
(quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Ml ih 
1987)) 
^22 . :. cnis case, the parties did not dispute that Hanson 
repaired che moving truck's hydraulic line, that the hydraulic 
line failed, that Mr. Normandeau was called to tow the truck, and 
that he was then killed when the driveline hit him in the head. 
By denying summary judgment, the district court implicitly found 
that Hanson had a duty to avoid creating a hazardous situation 
for a tow truck driver. The intertwined questions of fact did 
not go to the question of whether Hanson owed a duty to Mr. 
Normandeau, biit rather to whether the repair to the driveline was 
the proximate cause of his death. Thus, like the losing parties 
in Estate Landscaping and Prince Yeates, Hanson would not have 
benefitted from reraising the issue of duty at trial. The jury 
could not decide the issue as the court had already made a purely 
legal determination based on the undisputed material facts. And 
no new evidence was offered at trial to undermine the basis for 
the court's initial determination. 
II, ONCE A PARTY HAS PROPERLY PRESERVED A PURELY LEGAL ISSUE 
THROUGH A PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO RERAISE THAT ISSUE AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO PRESERVE IT 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
i|23 Because the district court ruled on summary judgment 
that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care Hanson was not 
(...continued) 
foreseeability of an injury occurring, "the questions relating to 
negligence and proximate cause are generally for the fact-trier, 
court or jury, to determine." Rees, 587 P.2d at 133. But the 
foreseeability discussed in Rees--whether Albertson's could have 
reasonably foreseen that breaching its duty not to sell beer to 
minors--related to whether Albertson's was the proximate cause of 
the resulting accident not, as contested by the Normandeaus, 
whether Albertson's had a duty not to sel ] the beer. 
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required to reraise the duty issue in a motion for directed 
verdict in order to preserve its appellate rights. Ml]n order 
to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to 
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, % 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). An issue is 
preserved if it is raised in a timely fashion, clearly 
identified, and adequately briefed. Id. " [O]nee trial counsel 
has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court 
has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal." 
Id. We impose no specific requirement that "a party . . . file a 
post-judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to 
filing an appeal." Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, f 16, 2 
P.3d 442 (reviewing grant of partial summary judgment even though 
it was not raised in a postjudgment motion). 
1]24 The Normandeaus argue that we should require parties to 
reraise legal issues decided on summary judgment to give the 
court a chance to reconsider them in light of the facts presented 
and decided at trial. It is true that "the interlocutory nature 
of a partial summary judgment leaves [determinations made in such 
motions] subject to modification by the trial court up until the 
entry of final judgment." Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 1 20, 
144 P. 3d 114 7. But raising a legal issue during a summary 
judgment motion based on the undisputed facts properly provides 
the court with an opportunity to rule on the issue. And once the 
district court has an opportunity to consider the legal issue, as 
is the case when the motion for summary judgment is denied based 
on the undisputed facts that do not materially change at the 
subsequent trial, we will not require parties to reraise the same 
issue in order to preserve it for appeal. We therefore hold that 
by moving for summary judgment on the issue of duty, Hanson 
properly preserved that issue for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
^25 The court of appeals erred in determining that it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Hanson's appeal of the district 
court's denial of its summary judgment motion on the issue of 
duty. Hanson was not required to reraise the duty issue at the 
close of trial in order to preserve its right to appeal the 
district court's decision. We therefore reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand this matter to the court of 
appeals to consider whether the district court properly ruled 
that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. 
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1(26 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Dun ant, 
Justice Wilkins, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish s 
opinion. 
11 No. 20071006 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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tl Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. (Hanson) appeals the jury 
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Emily Normandeau, individually and 
as guardian for Alex Thayn, Jacob Thayn, and Hannah Normandeau, 
minors; and Lori Normandeau, as guardian for Daniel Normandeau 
and Melissa Normandeau, minors, on behalf of and for the benefit 
of the heirs of Dennis Normandeau (Plaintiffs). We affirm. 
OPINION 
(Foi: Of f i c i a 1 Pub 1 i cat i on) 
Case No. 20060723-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 2 9 , 2 0 07) 
12007 UT App 382[ 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In early 2001, Dennis Normandeau started working as a 
mechanic for Kenworth Sales Company, a diesel maintenance and 
repair shop and towing service. In May or June 2001, 
Normandeau's duties were increased to include working as the 
primary wrecking driver. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth 
trained Normandeau for his new responsibility and taught him how 
to use a large diesel wrecker. 
%3 On November 10, 2 0 01, Normandeau responded to a call for 
roadside assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down in 
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah. The truck had a spring-
applied, hydraulically-released parking brake system. The 
parking or emergency brake was on the driveline behind the 
transmission and ran off the power steering unit. The truck 
broke down because it had a leak in the power steering line, 
which caused the parking brake to engage, preventing the 
driveline from turning and causing torque to build up in the 
driveline. 
%A To tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline 
from the transmission. As Normandeau was disconnecting the 
driveline, the built-up torque released violently, causing the 
differential yoke to break off. Either the differential yoke or 
the driveshaft hit Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly. 
1(5 Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action, alleging that 
Hanson had earlier repaired the truck negligently, which caused 
it to break down. Plaintiffs' lawsuit also included 
International Truck & Engine Corporation (ITEC), which was the 
designer of the truck's hydraulic system, as well as other 
companies associated with the design, manufacture, and lease of 
the truck. All of the defendants except Hanson were dismissed 
before trial. 
%6 Prior to trial, Hanson filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Hanson owed no duty of care to Normandeau, 
that Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's 
death, and that Normandeau was negligent in preparing the truck 
for towing. The trial court denied Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment, and the case went to trial. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Hanson then filed a motion for a 
new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. The trial 
court denied that motion, and Hanson now appeals. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1"./ On appeal, Hanson first asserts that the trial court erred 
when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Because the 
issues presented to the trial court for summary judgment were 
also presented to the jury at trial, we do not consider this 
argument on the merits. 
f8 Second, Hanson claims that the trial court erred when it 
failed to instruct the jury regarding ITEC's negligent design of 
the truck's hydraulic system, which caused the parking brake to 
engage and resulted in the presence of torque in the driveline. 
"We review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness 
standard." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998) 
%9 Third, Hanson asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it failed to strike Normandeau's untimely 
designation of an expert witness who highlighted material issues 
of fact in opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Hanson 
further argues that this error was compounded when the trial 
court granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude 
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from testifying at trial. 
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases before 
them . ." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Constr., 1999 UT App 87, f 11, 977 P.2d 518. Therefore, we 
review whether a trial court properly ruled on pretrial 
compliance with a scheduling order under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See id. We also review the trial court's grant of 
Plaintiffs' motion in limine under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Walker v. Hansen, 2 003 UT App 23 7, f 12, 74 P 3 d 
635. 
KlO Fourth, Hanson argues that Normandeau's counsel made 
improper closing arguments at trial and that these improper 
arguments warrant a new trial. "[T]he grant of a new trial is 
ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court[/ 
therefore,] we . . . review the court's decision in this regard 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Child, 972 P.2d at 429. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment 
i|ll Hanson first argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. However, before we 
reach the merits of this argument, we must decide, as a threshold 
matter, whether we should entertain an appeal of the trial 
court's denial of summary judgment after the case was 
subsequently resolved by a trial on the merits. 
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Hl2 Generally, "[a] denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
not a final determination on the merits and, therefore, is not an 
appealable interlocutory order." Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. 
Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Colo. 1996); see also Heuser v. 
Schmittroth, 2002 UT App 42U (mem.) (per curiam) ("The denial of 
a summary judgment motion is not final and appealable because it 
leaves the case pending. Upon denial of [a] summary judgment 
motion, [the losing party] ha[s] the burden to either try the 
case or dismiss it."); Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc., 
631 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1981) (noting that in "most . . . 
jurisdictions[,] the denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
not a final order which may be appealed but is, rather, an 
unappealable interlocutory ruling"). Some jurisdictions, 
including Utah, will allow a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment to be appealed, but only after the final judgment is 
entered in the case. See Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116; see, e.g., 
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 1043 (reviewing 
the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment). 
However, "[i]n a substantial number of jurisdictions, . . . 
reviewability is denied even after final judgment, particularly 
where the case has gone to trial subsequent to the denial of the 
summary judgment motion." Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116.x A few 
1. See also Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st Cir. 
1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570-72 (5th Cir. 
1994); Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 276-78 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Johnson Intf1 Co. v. Jackson Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 19 
F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1994); Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 
1016 (6th Cir. 1990); Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft 
Servs., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1988); Locricchio v. 
Legal Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed Cir. 
1986); Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 
(Colo. 1996); Phillips v. Abel, 233 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1977) (holding a motion for summary judgment is moot after the 
evidence has been reviewed in a trial on the merits); Evans v. 
Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 459 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that 
a final judgment after trial should be tested upon the record 
made at trial not at the time summary judgment was denied); 
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding that 
after a full trial on the merits the denial of summary judgment 
merges with the trial); Skowronski v. Sachs, 818 N.E.2d 635, 638 
n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that no right to review exists 
when case has proceeded to trial on the merits, unless the 
summary judgment issue was on a different claim than was tried); 
Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
("Improper denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
(continued...) 
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jurisdictions provide an exception to this principle and will 
allow appellate review of a denial of summary judgment even after 
a trial on the merits, but only if the motion for summary 
judgment was based on a purely legal question.2 
f13 Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appea. • ; 
denial of a motion for summary judgment only if it involves a 
legal issue. In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, 
Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.f 844 P.2d 322 
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a denial of summary 
judgment after a trial on the merits because the trial court "was 
dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of summary 
judgment amounted to a ruling of law." Id. at 326. But in 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147, the Utah Supreme 
Court declined to review a denial of partial motions for summary 
judgment because " [a]t trial, [the moving party] had the 
opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary 
judgment motions." Id. ^ 19. Specifically, the moving party 
"was allowed to present his evidence and argument on the issues." 
Id. The supreme court reasoned that "[i]n appealing a summary 
judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were 
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal," 
Id. % 20. Thus, our case law suggests that only the legal issues 
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party 
from dealing with the issue at tr:i al wil] be considered after a 
trial on the merits. 
[^14 We conclude that the denial of the motion for summary 
judgment is not appealable under prior Utah case law and the 
facts of this case. The issue of proximate cause and negligence 
were presented to the jury and decided against Hanson. 
1. (...continued) 
reversible error when the case has proceeded to trial and has 
been determined on the merits by the trier of the facts . . ." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Qndrusek v. Murphy, 
120 P.3d 1053, 1055-56 & n.2 (Alaska 2005) (reviewing a summary 
judgment denial, but noting that although the Alaska Supreme 
Court "has reviewed summary judgment denials" in the past, it 
would "give serious consideration in the future to adoption of 
what seems to be the majority view concerning reviewability of 
summary judgment denials"). 
2. See, e.g., Wiles v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 1297, 
1301 (10th Cir. 1999); Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 
Ill F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997); Regency Commercial Assocs. 
v. Lopax, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 320 (111. App. Ct. 2007); 
Gallegos v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ. , 1997-NMCA-4 0, 11 R, ~ - r , 
3 62, 94 0 P.2d 4 68. 
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Certainly, the trial court did not err in declining to rule as a 
matter of law that Hanson's negligence was not a proximate cause 
of Normandeau's death. The issue of duty, though technically an 
issue of law, is heavily fact-sensitive and is intertwined with 
the issue of forseeability, which was also presented to the jury 
and decided against Hanson. Indeed, Hanson "was accorded the 
opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id. Finally, and 
most importantly, there was nothing preventing Hanson from making 
a motion to dismiss at trial on the issue of duty, thus 
preserving this issue for appeal. "Consequently, the trial 
court's . . . denial [] of . . . summary judgment resulted in no 
prejudice[ and] did not affect the final outcome . . . ." Id. 
Therefore, we do not review the denial of Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. 
II. Jury Instructions 
fl5 Hanson next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to 
give its requested jury instruction regarding ETEC's negligent 
design of the truck's hydraulic system. Hanson requested that 
the jury be instructed on negligent design law and that ITEC be 
listed on the special verdict form as a possibLe negligent party 
and intervening cause. Hanson submitted Model Utah Jury 
Instruction (MUJI) 12.16, which provides: "The manufacturer of a 
product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently 
made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of the 
product, so that the product may be safely used in a manner and 
for a purpose for which it was made." However, the trial court 
did not include MUJI 12.16 with the other jury instructions. 
Ul6 We review a challenged jury instruction in context with all 
other jury instructions provided to the jury. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, <fl 16, 977 P.2d 474. "'As 
we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole 
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error 
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing 
alone, is not as accurate as it might have been.'" Id. (quoting 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (citation 
omitted). A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on its 
theory of the case if competent evidence is presented at trial to 
support its theory. See Van Erickson v. Sorenson, 877 P.2d 144, 
151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, it is not entitled to have 
the jury instructed with any particular wording. See id. As 
long as the instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the 
jury on applicable law, it is not error to refuse a particular 
instruction. See id. ("'[I]t is not error [for the trial court] 
to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly covered 
in the other instructions.'" (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 
643, 647 (Utah 1982))). 
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1Jl7 Although MUJI 12.16 was not included in the set of 
instructions given to the jury, the trial court provided 
sufficient jury instructions regarding Hanson's claim that ITEC 
was negligent. For example, in jury instruction 19, the trial 
court told the jury that Hanson "claim[ed] that other persons are 
responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, including [ITEC] (the 
manufacturer of the Ryder truck)" and that Hanson "claim[ed] that 
the negligence of these others was the cause of 
Normandeau's death." 
f^ 18 Further , jury insi nn't ion itvnl: 
Although [ITEC] and Plaintiffs reached a 
resolution of the issues between them in this 
case, [ITEC] still remains as a Defendant in 
this action. Thus, it will be your duty to 
assess and allocate fault in this matter, 
whether that allocation be against: . . . 
Normandeau and/or Hanson and/or against 
[ITEC] . . . . 
And, jury instruction 23 told the jury that "[ujnless otherwise 
stated, all instructions given [to] you govern the case as to 
each Defendant. The mere fact that an accident or injury 
occurred does not support the conclusion that any party was [at] 
fault or negligent." 
^19 The trial court went on to define negligence and comparative 
negligence without limiting those instructions to Hanson or 
Normandeau, and without excluding ITEC. Jury instruction 38, on 
comparative negligence, stated in part: 
If you decide that more than one person 
was responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, 
you must decide each person's percentage of 
fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty 
and includes negligence. This allocation of 
fault must be done on a percentage basis, and 
the total must be 100%. Each person's 
percentage should be based on how much that 
person's fault contributed to , 
Normandeau's death. 
11.'it Finally, in jury instruction 45, the court told the jury: 
Hanson . . . ^ d [ITEC] are corporations 
and, as such, can act only through their 
officers and employees, and others designated 
by it as its agents. 
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Any act or omission of an officer, 
employee, or agent of a corporation, in the 
performance of their [sic] duties or within 
the scope of the authority of the officer, 
employees or agent, is the act or omission of 
the corporation. So, if you find that the 
preponderance of the evidence shows that an 
officer, agent, or employee of a particular 
corporation was negligent in performing his 
duties or within the scope of this authority, 
then you must find that particular 
corporation was negligent. 
1(21 These instructions, when read in context with the trial 
court's other jury instructions, adequately informed the jury 
that it could find that ITEC was at fault in causing Normandeaufs 
death if ITEC had acted negligently. Counsel for Hanson argued 
to the jury that ITEC was negligent, and the jury rejected those 
arguments. In answer to the specific question, "Was any fault on 
the part of [ITEC] a cause of the death of . . . Normandeau?" the 
jury answered, "No." Therefore, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in failing to include MUJI 12.16 in the set of 
instructions provided to the jury because the other instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury regarding ITEC's 
alleged negligence. 
1J22 Hanson further argues that ITEC should have been listed as a 
potentially negligent party on the special verdict form. 
However, ITEC was listed as a potentially responsible party on 
the special verdict form. Specifically, the special verdict form 
asked the jury, "Was the Defendant [ITEC] strictly liable under 
the facts of this case?" and "Was any fault on the part of [ITEC] 
a cause of the death of . . ., Normandeau?" The jury answered 
"No" to each of these questions. We acknowledge that ITEC was 
listed as a party under a theory of strict liability, and not 
specifically as a party under a theory of negligence. However, 
because ITEC was included as a party on the special verdict form 
and because the jury was asked the general question of whether 
ITEC was the cause of Normandeau's death and the jury answered 
"No," we conclude that any error in not listing ITEC as a 
potentially negligent party was harmless. 
III. Untimely Designation of Expert Witnesses 
and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine 
1[23 Hanson also argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to strike Plaintiffs' untimely designation 
of their towing expert, Jesse A. Enriquez, and that the trial 
court erred when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which 
sought to limit the opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor 
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and co-worker. We conclude that both of these rulings were 
within the trial court's discretion. 
1|24 First, under the original scheduling order, the parties were 
to exchange rebuttal expert witnesses by March 11, 2005. The 
trial court later entered a new scheduling order that gave Hanson 
until May 31, 2 005, to designate its experts. The revised 
schedule did not contain any date for rebuttal expert 
designations, and Hanson did not designate any experts before it 
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim that Enriquez was a 
rebuttal expert who was used to respond to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. Upon receiving Enriquez's affidavit, served in 
conjunction with Plaintiff's opposition to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment, Hanson moved to strike the affidavit on the 
grounds that Enriquez was not timely designated as an expert. 
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Hanson's 
motion and allowed Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez. It also 
allowed Hanson to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing 
expert. Hanson then hired LaMar McQuaid, a towing expert, who 
testified at trial on behalf of Hanson 
|^25 We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion 
to allow Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez as a towing expert and 
to allow his testimony as a response to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. "A trial court has necessary discretion in 
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and management 
conferences." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1361 
(Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 16 ("[T]he court, upon i ts 
own motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a 
scheduling and management conference."). "Because the trial 
judge deals primarily with the parties and the discovery process, 
he or she has great latitude in determining the most efficient 
and fair manner to conduct the court's business." A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 
U 36, 977 P. 2d 518. This includes "discretion in determining 
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants sanction," 
id., such as striking Enriquez's expert affidavit, see Utah Pep't 
of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (recognizing 
that "[t]he striking of pleadings ,. . . [is one of] the most 
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a 
party"). 
^26 Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs' designation of 
Enriquez as an expert was untimely and that Plaintiffs therefore 
violated the scheduling order, Hanson was not prejudiced by any 
such untimely designation because the trial court gave Hanson an 
opportunity to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing 
expert. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing, 1999 UT App 87, 
f 37. Moreover, the designation of the towing experts came well 
in advance of trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
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allowing Plaintiffs' designation of Enriquez as a towing expert. 
See id. 
1127 Hanson further argues that the trial court erred when it 
granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which sought to limit the 
opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker. 
However, Hanson failed to provide an adequate record to enable 
this court to review the trial court's ruling. In their motion 
in limine, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should preclude 
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from expressing opinions 
about the cause of and the responsibility for Normandeau's 
accident. Plaintiffs asserted that Normandeau's supervisor and 
co-worker were lay witnesses whose opinions were based on 
personal perception, lacked foundation, required speculation, 
stated legal conclusions, invaded the province of the jury, and 
would not assist the trier of fact. Hanson responded by arguing 
that Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker provided expert 
testimony and that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by these 
individuals providing such expert testimony. 
f28 On January 30, 2 006, a hearing was held concerning 
Plaintiffs' motion in limine. However, the record before us 
provides no transcript of that hearing. Instead, we are only 
provided with the minutes, which state that a motion in limine 
was argued and that "[t]he [c]ourt rule[d] as stated on the 
record." This statement does not provide us with the facts the 
trial court considered in making its ruling, the trial court's 
basis for granting Plaintiffs' motion in limine, or the trial 
court's findings and legal conclusions. The only information 
concerning Plaintiffs' motion in limine that the record provides 
is that the trial court did, in fact, grant Plaintiff's motion. 
1(29 If a party fails to provide an adequate record, we will 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Moreover, we 
note that "'a trial judge is accorded broad discretion in 
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom.'" 
Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, % 16, 163 P.3d 615 
(quoting University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 
633 (Utah 1987)). As such, we conclude that the trial court was 
within its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in 
limine regarding the testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-
worker. See id. (holding that "a trial court is free . . . to 
alter a previous in limine ruling, . . . [and to] exercise its 
discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine 
rulings" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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IV Improper Closing Argument 
[^30 Finally, Hanson argues that the trial court erred when 
denied Hanson's motion for a new trial because of allegedly 
improper and prejudicial remarks Plaintiffs' counsel made in his 
closing arguments. However, Hanson did not timely object to 
these statements at trial. "Absent an objection by [a] 
defendant, we will presume waiver of all arguments regarding the 
appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls 
into the category of plain error." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 
P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Hanson does not argue plain error, 
nor do we find any plain error regarding Plaintiffs' counsel's 
closing argument. Therefore, we do not address Hanson's argument 
that Plaintiffs' attorney made improper statements during closing 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
^31 Regarding Hanson's argument that the trial court erred in 
denying its summary judgment motion, we conclude that such a 
denial is not appealable under the facts of this case. 
Therefore, we do not address it. We further conclude that the 
trial court's jury instructions were proper and adequately 
informed the jury of the law concerning Hanson's defense. 
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it allowed the designation of Plaintiffs' expert 
and granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine. Finally, we do not 
address Hanson's claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's closing 
arguments were improper because Hanson failed to object to them 
at trial. 
1|32 Accordingly, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
113 3 I CONCUR: 
James Z, Davis, Judge 
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ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
i[34 I concur in the balance of the opinion, but I disagree with 
my colleagues that there is appellate jurisdiction over only some 
denials of summary judgment. I believe that once a final 
judgment has been entered, we have jurisdiction over appeals 
questioning the denial of a motion for summary judgment 
regardless of the basis for the denial, although I recognize that 
such appeals will ordinarily be for naught as a practical matter. 
[^35 Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, Utah 
recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment 
in its notice of appeal, it is "not precluded from alleging 
errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or 
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were 
properly preserved."1 Zion's First Natf1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain 
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997). On the 
contrary, "[w]hen an appellant files a notice of appeal from a 
final judgment, he may, in his opening brief, challenge all 
nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that final 
judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Professors Wright and Miller specifically recognize that this 
familiar precept applies to denials of summary judgment. See 10A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2715, at 264-66 (3d ed. 1998) 
1. I readily agree with the majority that a denial of summary 
judgment, an intermediate order, is not immediately appealable as 
a matter of right. See Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ^ 20 & 
n.13, 144 P.3d 1147. While a party may petition to have the 
denial considered on interlocutory appeal, it is not required to 
do so. See generally Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Utah has a long 
history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single 
appeal from a single action, see, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire 
Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, H 9, 123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 1 68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Gara v. Findlav, 7 
Utah 2d 218, 321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958), and only rarely will an 
interlocutory appeal be granted from the deniail of a summary 
judgment motion. When leave is not sought or when it is sought 
but denied, the question of whether the intermediate order was 
erroneous does not vaporize but is simply pushed forward for 
possible consideration after the entry of final judgment. 
Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one 
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek 
appeal of every intermediate disposition along the way, as their 
right to fuss about such dispositions will be fully preserved for 
appeal following the entry of final judgment. 
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("[After] entry of judgment following the trial on the merits, 
. . . the party who unsuccessfully sought summary judgment may 
argue that the trial court's denial of the Rule 56 motion was 
erroneous ") (footnotes omitted) .2 
|^36 What I have said goes only to jurisdiction--to the power of 
an appellate court to consider all interlocutory orders on appeal 
from a final judgment, including interlocutory orders denying 
summary judgment motions. I do not mean to suggest that such 
challenges are likely to be successful. Indeed, as a practical 
matter, it will be hard for a party to argue entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law when judge or jury, having heard all 
the evidence and seen live witnesses, actually awarded judgment 
to the other side. In such a case, the appealing party is 
fighting an impossible battle in the absence of a mistake of law 
impacting the judgment entered. Even in the case where denial of 
a summary judgment motion turns exclusively on a legal issue, it 
will ordinarily be more efficient to reassert that legal issue in 
the context of a motion to dismiss at the close of the 
plaintiff's case, a motion for directed verdict, a challenge to 
the trial court's instructions to the jury, etc.--and to seek 
2. The majority relies upon Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 3 44 
P. 3d 1147, in concluding that in Utah "only the legal issues 
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party 
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a 
trial on the merits." Lead Opinion J^ 13. In Wayment, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "only facts and legal theories that were 
foreclosed [by a summary judgment ruling] from being addressed at 
trial may be heard on appeal," 2006 UT 56, ^  20 (emphasis in 
original), but it cited no authority in support of that 
pronouncement, it did not characterize the limitation as 
jurisdictional, and it did not cross-reference the general ru.1e 
set forth in Zion's First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain 
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142 (Utah 1997), which I quote in % 35 
of this opinion. Thus, it seems entirely possible that the Court 
had in mind the same kind of practical inefficacy of such a 
challenge on appeal that I readily recognize, rather than a true 
jurisdictional bar. 
The majority also relies upon Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court 
did review a denial of summary judgment, see id. at 325-31, but 
such reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court's only relevant: 
references were with respect to its determination of the 
appropriate standards of review. See id. at 326 ("Because he was 
dealing with undisputed facts, [the trial judge]'s denial of 
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law, which we review for 
correctness[. ] ") . 
2 00^ ,07 23 i 7 13 
appellate consideration of the trial court's pertinent rulings--
than to overtly challenge the trial court's earlier denial of 
summary judgment. But such barriers to success on appeal from a 
denial of summary judgment are practical, not jurisdictional. 
Accordingly, I believe that Hanson was free to raise its 
challenge to the trial court's denial of its motion for summary 
judgment and that we are obliged to consider that challenge on 
its merits, such as they are. 
%31 On the merits, I cannot say that the trial court erred in 
denying Hanson's summary judgment motion. Hanson's moving papers 
failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty 
of care to Normandeau, that Hanson's repair did not proximately 
cause Normandeau's death, or that Normandeau was negligent in 
preparing the truck for towing. Accordingly, the trial court 
ruled correctly in denying the motion. 
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*1 Princeton Biochemicals, Inc ("Princeton") appeals the 
decision of the Umted States Distnct Court for the District 
of New Jersey, No 96-CV-5541, granting Beckman 
Instruments, Inc 's ("Beckman's") motion for summary 
judgment of noninfringement of claim 32 of Princeton's 
US Patent No 5,045,172 Because the district court 
incorrectly construed that claim, we vacate the grant of 
summary judgment, and remand the case to determine 
literal infringement m light of the correct claim 
construction 
BACKGROUND 
Prmceton is the owner of U S Patent No 5,045 J72 ("the 
'172 patent") entitled Capillary Electrophoresis Apparatus 
The'172 patent is directed to an apparatus for use in the 
process of capillary electrophoresis whereby molecules 
and proteins are separated from fluid samples as a result 
of application of an electrical charge Capillary 
electrophoresis technology itself is not at issue on appeal 
Rather, part of the apparatus used m that process is, 
namely, the "holder" limitation of claim 32 (emphasized 
below m element [6]) 
32 Capillary electrophoresis apparatus comprising 
[1] a capillary tube of the type which can be electrically 
charged, 
[2] said capillary tube havmg first and second ends, 
[3] first means at said first end of said capillary tube 
providmg a source of buffer solution and a source of a 
sample substance to be analyzed, 
[4] second means coupled to said apparatus for applymg 
electrical potential across said capillary tube whereby a 
sample flows through said capillary tube and past said 
detector, 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
Page 2 
215 F.3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C.A.Fed. (NJ.)) 
(Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unpublished Disposition 
(Cite as: 215 F.3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C.A.Fed. (NJ.))) 
[5] said first means includes a rotatable table carrying a 
plurality of sample cups and 
[6] a holder for holding an end of said capillary tube in 
operative relation with one of the said cups, said cups 
containing either buffer solution or a sample to be 
analyzed, 
[7] said capillary tube is in the form of a coil of glass 
tubing 
[8] wherein said coil of glass tubing is secured to a 
support member. 
(paragraphing added for clarity). In the claimed apparatus, 
fluid samples to be tested (or buffer solutions) are 
contained in sample cups, which in turn are placed on a 
rotating table to facilitate ease of multiple sample testing. 
Each individual sample flows through a coiled, glass 
capillary tube secured to a support member, the capillary 
tube being held by the holder of element [6] "in operative 
relation" with the sample cup. As the sample flows 
through the capillary tube, an electrical potential is applied 
across the tube and a signal is sent to a detector to 
facilitate separation of the various components of the fluid 
sample. 
The prosecution history resulting in the issuance of claim 
32 will be discussed in the context of claim construction 
below. Nevertheless, to briefly summarize, claim 32, the 
only claim at issue on appeal, issued after 
continuation-in-part (CIP) application—claims 1,39, and 
40 were combined. Elements [1] through [6] of claim 32 
stemmed from CIP application claim 1, element [7] 
stemmed from CIP application claim 39, and element [8] 
stemmed from CIP application claim 40. 
FN1. That a CIP application and not a straight 
continuation application was filed is not relevant 
to the disposition of this case, as the new 
material added to the specification when the CIP 
was filed was not directed to the holder 
limitation at issue. 
*2 Princeton sued Beckman for patent infringement, 
asserting that Beckman's P/ACE electrophoresis devices 
infringed claim 32 of the'172 patent. The P/ACE devices 
consist of an apparatus in which a vertically moving table 
and sample cup is "in operative relation" with a stationary 
capillary. The parties disputed whether the claim covers 
only the embodiment where the holder and the capillary 
tube move vertically toward a stationary sample cup and 
table, or also the alternative embodiment in which the 
sample cup and table move vertically toward a stationary 
holder and capillary tube as in the accused devices. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
held a Markman hearing and construed the claim. The 
district court interpreted the holder limitation of element 
[6] as "requiring] an apparatus equipped with a holder 
that lowers the capillary into [the] sample cup before 
testing and raises the capillary out of the cup after testing." 
Slip op. at 11. In other words, the district court construed 
the language "in operative relation" in element [6] to 
require "vertical movement of the arm which holds the 
capillary" toward stationary sample cups, Slip op. at 14, 
rather than vertical movement of the sample cups or the 
tray holding the sample cups toward a stationary arm 
holding the capillary. 
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The district court based its claim construction on the 
specification which it found "consistently describes the 
arm as a vertically moveable component which would 
lower the capillary so as to permit it to come into contact 
with the sample cups." Slip op. at 13-14. The district court 
also relied on the prosecution history. In particular, the 
district court cited the following as support for its claim 
construction: (1) the June 2, 1988 office action rejection 
over Stevenson, U.S. Patent No. 3,918,913, which 
"contains all of the critical elements recited in the 
plaintiffs claims: a rotating turntable, a vertically moving 
sample probe, etc."; (2) the addition of two new claims 
(29 and 30) in response to that rejection that were limited 
to a vertically moveable arm and accompanying comments 
in the remarks section; (3) a response to the advisory 
action of January 31, 1989 stating "the application has 
claims which are very detailed as to the apparatus for 
raising and lowering a capillary into the sample cups"; and 
(4) the cancellation of application claims 22 to 24 that 
claimed the alternate embodiment of a stationary capillary 
and a vertically moving table and sample cups. 
Based on this claim construction, the district court granted 
Beckman's motion for summary judgment of 
noninfringement. The district court determined that the 
accused P/ACE devices did not contain the "exact same 
holder limitation" and in fact "d[id] not contain any such 
element." Slip op. at 17. The district court further stated 
that "[t]he capillary in the alleged infringing device is 
stationary; it does not move vertically. Moreover, the 
alleged infringing device has no holder for the capillary at 
all." Slip op. at 18. As a result of these determinations, the 
district court granted summary judgment of 
noninfringement— Princeton appeals. 
FN2. The district court also granted summary 
judgment of noninfringement under the Doctrine 
of Equivalents, noting that the accused devices 
did not contain an equivalent element to the 
holder described in element [6] of claim 32, in 
particular an element that would move the 
capillaries in and out of the sample cups. Slip op. 
at 20-21. Princeton has not appealed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment of no 
equivalent infringement, and this issue may not 
be raised on remand. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. 
Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1382-83, 49 
USPQ2d 1618, 1621 (Fed.Cir.1999). 
DISCUSSION 
*3 Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., All U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986) (summary judgment is proper when no "reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party"). In 
deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party with doubts resolved in its favor. See 
O.I. Cory, v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1580, 42 
USPQ2d 1777, 1779 (Fed.Cir. 1997). We review a grant 
of summary judgment de novo. See Conroy v. Reebok 
Int'l. Ltd, 14 F.3d 1570, 1575, 29 USPQ2d 1373, 1377 
(Fed.Cir.1994). 
Princeton argues that the district court erred in construing 
element [6], i.e., the "holder limitation," of claim 32. In 
particular, Princeton asserts that the district court erred by 
requiring a "vertically moving" holder as no such 
limitation is present in the asserted claim. Nor, argues 
Princeton, were any arguments made during the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Page 4 
215 F 3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C A Fed (N J)) 
(Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unpublished Disposition 
(Cite as 215 F3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C A Fed (NJ))) 
prosecution of the application that resulted in the '172 
patent and directed at claim 32 that would support readmg 
a vertical movement limitation mto that claim We agree 
Claim construction is a matter of law, see Markman v 
Westviewlnsti uments, Inc, 52 F 3d 967,979,34 USPQ2d 
1321, 1329(FedCir 1995)(enbanc),affd, 517US 370, 
372, 116 S Ct 1384, 134 LEd2d 577 (1996), that we 
review de novo, see Cvbor Corp v FAS Techs , Inc ,138 
F 3d 1448,1456,46 USPQ2d 1169,1174 (Fed Cir 1998) 
(en banc) 
On its face, element [6] of claim 32 would encompass 
embodiments in which both the holder/capillary and the 
sample cups/table are vertically movable In order to 
narrow the claim as the district court did to require only 
that the holder/capillary be vertically movable, the phrase 
"in operative relation" must be viewed as sufficiently in 
need of clarification to resort to the wntten description as 
urged by Beckman See Remshaw PLC v Marposs 
Societa' Per Aziom, 158 F 3d 1243, 1248, 48 USPQ2d 
1117, 1121 (Fed Cir 1998) ("[A] party wishing to use 
statements in the wntten description to confine or 
otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, 
pomt to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw m 
those statements Without any claim term that is 
susceptible of clanfication by the wntten descnption, there 
is no legitimate way to narcow the property right") To 
clarify what "in operative relation" means, we conclude 
that resort to the wntten descnption is permissible m this 
case 
*4 Beckman urges us to adopt the requirement that the 
district court did, namely, that the holder is limited to 
vertical movement in relation to stationary sample cups on 
a stationary table The portions of the wntten descnption 
relied on by Beckman do indeed mdicate such vertical 
movement — However, Beckman fails to appreciate the 
import of the clear disclosure m the wntten descnption of 
the alternate embodiment m which the sample cup and 
table move vertically in relation to a stationary capillary 
and holder 
FN3 "[A] vertical rod 250 [i e , the holder] 
which is suitable mounted so that it can be driven 
vertically up and down "'172 Patent, col 4, 11 
42-43, "[T]he capillary can be inserted mto a 
sample cup in table 170 "'172 Patent col 6,11 
41-42, "[Mjotor 260 is energized to lower the 
arm 240 and the apparatus mcludmg tube 248 
mto the cup contammg sample matenal" '172 
Patent, col 8, 11 61-63, "[M]otor 260 is 
energized to lower the post 240 until the motor is 
stopped by its sensor 263 at just the pomt where 
the tip of the tube 248 is at about the bottom of 
the cup 190 "'172 Patent, col 9,11 15-18 
As a modification of the mvention, the apparatus 10 can 
be adapted to mclude means by which rather than 
raising and lowering the posts 250 and 250' and their 
associated apparatus, it raises and lowers either just 
specific sample cups or the entire tables 170 and 170' 
In this embodiment of the mvention, the motors 210 and 
210! would be constructed to both rotate the posts 200 
and 200' and to raise them and lower them vertically as 
required to raise and lower the tables 170 and 170' 
'172 Patent, col 9, 11 50-58 (emphasis added) 
Beckman's attempt to minimize the existence of this 
disclosure as a "lone sentence" in the wntten descnption 
is mentless 
Moreover, m the ongmally-filed application which 
eventually resulted in the '172 patent as originally filed, 
this alternate embodiment was claimed in ongmal 
application claims 22 to 24 
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FN4. That claims 22 to 24 were eventually 
canceled during prosecution does not affect our 
22. Capillary electrophoresis apparatus comprising analysis, and the district court erred in attaching 
significance to that action in support of its claim 
construction. 
first means at said first end of said capillary tube 
providing a source of a sample substance to be 
analyzed, 
said first means including a rotatable table carrying a 
plurality of sample cups and a holder for holding an 
end of said capillary tube in operative relation with one 
of said cups, and 
means for moving said table and said holder with respect 
to each other so that said end of said capillary tube can 
be moved into and out of operative relation with a 
sample cup. 
23. The apparatus defined in claim 22 wherein said table 
is movable vertically up and down with respect to said 
holder and is rotatable with respect to said holder. 
24. The apparatus defined in claim 22 and including a 
vertical post secured to said table and extending 
downwardly therefrom, and motor means coupled to 
said vertical post for rotating said table and for driving 
said table vertically up and down.— 
(Emphasis added.) The originally-filed claims are deemed 
part of the original specification. Thus, to the extent that 
originally-filed claims 22 to 24 and the written description 
at column 9, lines 50-58 describe an embodiment with a 
stationary holder and a vertically moving table and sample 
cups, Beckman errs in relying solely on those portions of 
the written description describing the vertically moving 
holder while ignoring those portions describing a 
vertically moving table. Absent language in the claim 
specifically limiting the phrase "in operative relation" to 
vertical holder movement, Beckman cannot find support 
for the district court's claim interpretation from the 
specification alone. 
*5 Beckman, reiterating the arguments used by the district 
court in coming to its claim construction, next asserts the 
prosecution history to support the district court's claim 
interpretation. Beckman argues that the patentee limited 
the scope of the claims to vertically moving holders and 
stationary tables by amending the claims in response to 
prior art disclosing vertically moving tables and stationary 
holders, and by arguing in remarks accompanying those 
amendments that the invention was limited to that 
embodiment. Princeton responds that the amendments 
made in response to prior art were directed to claims that 
did not result in the issuance ofclaim 32, and that the prior 
art cited and interpreted by Beckman would not only 
preclude claiming vertically moving sample cups and 
tables but also vertically moving holders and capillaries. 
A careful review of the prosecution history reveals that 
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Princeton is correct Claim 32 resulted from the 
combination of claims 1, 39 and 40 as filed m a CIP 
application The original patent application contamed 28 
claims, to which new claims 29 and 30 were added during 
prosecution Claim 1 contamed the holder limitation found 
in issued claim 32 Claim 1 was amended m response to 
prior art to mclude the vertical movement limitation urged 
by Beckman, although the holder limitation itself was 
never amended 
Eventually, a CIP application was filed m which claim 1 
was returned to its original, unamended form Thereafter, 
claim 1 was rejected as obvious over prior art However, 
claim 1 was not subsequently amended to include any 
requirement of vertical movement and in fact was not 
amended to distinguish over the cited prior art — 
FN5 Claim 1 was amended to include the 
limitations of CIP application claim 49 directed 
to a T-shaped section of capillary tube inserted 
into the capillary tube to supply a source of 
cleaning fluid to clean the capillary tube 
New claims 31 through 49 were also added when the CIP 
application was filed Of relevance to issued claim 32, 
claim 39, which depended on claim 1, was directed to a 
glass coiled capillary, and claim 40, which depended on 
claim 39, was directed to that capillary attached to a 
support member Claim 39 was rejected as obvious over 
the prior art (the Stevenson patent and an article written by 
Rose and Jorgenson) Claim 40 was objected to-but not 
rejected-and was deemed allowable if the limitations of 
claims 1 and 39 were incorporated The applicant adopted 
the examiner's suggestion sequentially, first combmmg 
claims 1 and 39 and then later, after final rejection, 
mcludmg the limitations of claim 40 The examiner thus 
allowed the combmed claim to issue as claim 32 without 
any amendment bemg made or any argument bemg 
espoused that would limit the holder limitation to the 
embodiment where the holder/capillary is vertically 
moving m relation to a stationary sample cup/table 
We hold that the prosecution history does not limit the 
holder limitation of claim 32 to only vertically movable 
holders Although the applicant amended claim 1 to 
include a vertical movement requirement of the holder m 
the ongmal application, the subsequent filing of the CIP 
application and the return of claim 1 to its original, 
unamended form, counsels against applymg the usual rule 
that the entire prosecution history, mcludmg parent and 
grandparent applications, be analyzed in interpreting a 
claim See Mark I Marketing Cow v Donnelley & Sons 
Co. 66 F3d 285, 291, 36 USPQ2d 1095, 1100 
(Fed Cir 1995) 
*6 We also hold that the applicant did not limit claim 32 
to a vertically moving holder during prosecution as the 
amendments and arguments cited by the district court were 
directed to claims other than those that were combmed as 
issued claim 32 See Johnson Woi Idwide Assocs, Inc v 
Zebco Cow , 175 F Id 985,992, 50 USPQ2d 1607,1612 
(Fed Or 1999) ("carefully-crafted arguments" clearly 
directed to certain claims and not others will "avoid 
creating ambiguous or adverse prosecution history") 
Beckman's reliance on certain amendments and remarks 
made by the applicant during prosecution concerning 
holder limitations specifically limited to a vertically 
movable holder is misplaced Those amendments and 
remarks were directed primarily at application claim 8, a 
picture claim containing numerous other limitations and 
directed to the specific embodiment of a vertically mo vmg 
holder, and not to the broader holder limitation m claim 1 
that eventually resulted m issued claim 32 
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Beckman's reliance on the prior art, in particular the article 
by Rose and Jorgenson and the Stevenson patent, also 
does not lead to the conclusion that the claims must be 
limited to a vertically moving holder. That prior art 
discloses embodiments in which capillary tubes, individual 
sample cups, and rotatable sample tables are raised and 
lowered. If those combined teachings preclude claiming 
vertically moveable sample cups and tables as Beckman 
urges, then those teachings should also preclude claiming 
a vertically movable holder. Thus, Beckman's 
interpretation of the prior art would preclude claiming any 
apparatus having any vertical movement whatsoever. 
In summary, neither the written description nor the 
prosecution history provides any support for Beckman's 
assertion that the phrase "in operative relation" in the 
holder limitation must be limited to vertical movement of 
the holder. Thus, the district court erred in its claim 
construction. The proper interpretation of the holder 
limitation is that "in operative relation" encompasses both 
vertical movement of the holder as well as vertical 
movement of the sample cups and the table. 
Finally, Princeton urges that if we are to reverse the 
district court's claim interpretation, as we have done, we 
should also grant summary judgment of literal 
infringement as the P/ACE devices contain a "holder" in 
the form of either the cartridge which houses the coiled 
capillary tube itself or the plugs which seal the capillary 
tube ends to the cartridge wall at the inlet and outlet 
openings. Beckman asserts that this is inappropriate as the 
district court dismissed Princeton's motion for summary 
judgment of infringement as moot and thus is not before us 
on appeal. We agree with Beckman. In this case, the 
proper disposition is for us to remand the case to the 
district court to determine the issue of literal infringement 
in light of the correct claim interpretation. Although the 
district court determined that "the alleged infringing 
device has no holder for the capillary at all," Slip op. at 
18, this finding was based on an incorrect claim 
interpretation and thus cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
*7 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of 
summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 32 of 
Princeton's '172 patent is vacated and the case is remanded 
for a determination of literal infringement in light of the 
correct claim construction of the holder limitation. 
C.A.Fed. (NJ.),1999. 
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